

FAMILY COMPLEXES IN THE FORMATION
OF THE INDIVIDUAL

by

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The original French edition of the article was published
under the title LA FAMILLE in Encyclopédie française
(A. de Monzie, Editor), Vol.8, Paris 1938

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For private circulation only

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INTRODUCTION

THE INSTITUTION OF THE FAMILY

The family at first appears to be a natural group of individuals united by a twofold biological relationship: reproduction which provides the group with its constitutive elements, and certain environmental conditions necessary for the development of the young. The group stays together insofar as the reproducing adults assume the responsibility of maintaining these conditions. Among animals this task gives rise to instinctive forms of often very complex behaviour. It has been necessary to abandon the attempt to derive the other social phenomena observed among animals from the family relations so defined. These social phenomena appear, on the contrary, so distinct from family instincts that the most recent investigators link them to an original instinct they call interattractional.

The Cultural Structure of the Human Family

The human race is characterised by a quite particular development of social relations that is sustained by exceptional capacities for mental communication and, correlatively, by a paradoxical economy of instincts. Instincts in the case of man are susceptible in their very essence to conversion and inversion and can be seen to have an isolated effect in only the most sporadic

instances. An infinite variety of adaptive modes of behaviour is thus made possible. Since the conservation and development of these modes depend on their being communicated they are above all a collective work. They constitute culture which introduces a new dimension into social reality and psychic life. This dimension specifies the human family, as indeed it does all the social phenomena found among humans.

While it is true that in the first phases of maternal functioning, for example, the human family displays traits of instinctive behaviour that are identifiable with those of the biological family, we have only to reflect on what the notion of fatherhood owes to the spiritual assumptions that have marked its development to understand that in this field cultural agencies so dominate natural ones that there is no paradox if in certain cases, such as adoption, the cultural substitutes for the natural.

Is this cultural structure of the human family entirely accessible to observation and analysis the methods of concrete psychology? Doubtless these methods suffice to bring out some essential traits such as the hierarchical structure of the family, and to enable us to recognise in it the privileged organ of the constraint that the adult exercises over the child. To this constraint man owes a quite unique stage in his development and the primitive bases of his moral formation.

But there are other objective features: the organisational modes of this familial authority, the laws of its transmission, the concepts of progeny and of parenthood which are linked with it, the laws of inheritance and succession which combine with it, and finally its intimate links with the laws of marriage—these are entangled with psychological relationships and thus obscure them. Their interpretation should therefore be clarified by comparative data from ethnography, history, law and social statistics. When they are co-ordinated by the sociological method these data establish that the human family is an institution. Psychological analysis must therefore adapt itself to this complex structure and set aside the philosophical attempts whose object is the reduction of the human family to either a biological phenomenon or a theoretical element of society.

These attempts nevertheless have their source in certain manifestations of the phenomenon of the family. Illusory though these manifestations may be, it is worthwhile pausing to consider them because they are based on real convergences between heterogeneous causes. We will describe the mechanism at work at two points that are still controversial for the psychologist.

Psychological heredity: The family plays a primordial role in the transmission of culture. Even though spiritual traditions, the protection of ritual and customs, the conservation of techniques and of inheritance are shared by other social groups, the family is predominant in the first stages of education in the suppression of instincts and in the acquisition of the appropriately named "mother tongue". In this way the family presides over both the fundamental processes of psychic development and the organisation of emotions according to types conditioned by the environment which is, in Shand's opinion, the foundation of sentiments. From a broader point of view the family transmits those structures of behaviour and representation whose effects go beyond the limits of consciousness.

It thus establishes between the generations a psychic continuity whose causality is mental. This continuity, even though the artificiality of its foundations is shown in the very concepts that define the unity of the line of descent with notions like totem or family name, is equally well manifested by the transmission to descendants of psychic dispositions that are very close to being innate. Conn has created the term 'social heredity' for these effects. This term is rather unsuitable because of its ambiguity but has at least the merit of showing how difficult it is for a psychologist not to stress the importance of the biological in qualifying the facts of psychological heredity.

Biological kinship: Another completely contingent similarity is the fact that the normal components of the family as they are seen in our contemporary western world—father, mother and children—are the same as those of the biological family. This identity is in fact nothing more than a numerical equality. But there is a temptation to see in the similarity a common structure directly founded on the constancy of instincts—a constancy which must then be discovered in primitive forms of the family. On these

premises purely hypothetical theories of the primitive family have been founded, sometimes reflecting the promiscuity observable among animals—a view favoured by those critics who wish to subvert the existing family order—and at other times based on the model of the stable couple which can equally well be observed among animals—this view being favoured by the defenders of an institution which they consider to be the primary cell of society.

The primitive family; an institution; The theories we have just mentioned are not supported by any known facts. This hypothetical promiscuity can be nowhere confirmed, not even in so-called group marriages; from the very beginning there exist prohibitions and laws. The primitive forms of the family have the essential features of its most advanced forms: authority, which if not concentrated in a patriarchal manner is at least represented by a council, a matriarchy or its male delegates; and modalities of kinship, inheritance and succession which are transmitted, sometimes independently (Rivers), along a paternal or a maternal line. Here we do indeed have families that are fully constituted. But far from showing us the pretended primary cell of society, one can see in these families in the measure that they are more primitive not only more extensive aggregates of biological couples but above all a kinship which corresponds less to natural bonds of consanguinity.

The first point was demonstrated by Durkheim, and after him by Fauconnet, in the historical example of the Roman family. By examining family names and the rights of succession they discovered that three groups appeared successively, going from the more extended to the more restricted: the gens, a very extensive aggregate of different paternal stocks; the agnatic, more restricted but undivided; and finally the family that submitted the conjugal couples involving all sons and grandsons to the patria potestas of the grandfather.

With respect to our second point, the primitive family-disregards biological links of kinship. This disregard is only juridical in the bias towards a unilinear notion of filiation; but there is also a positive ignorance or perhaps a systematic miscognition (in the sense of a paradoxal belief which psychiatry has given to this term), a total exclusion of those bonds which, though they can only be exercised in regard to paternity, can be observed also in certain matriarchal cultures (Rivers and Malinowski). What is more, kinship is recognised only by means of rituals that legitimate blood ties and, when necessary, create artificial ones. The facts of totemism, adoption and the artificial constitution of an agnatic group such as the zadruga of the Slavs exemplify this. In the same way in our own civil code filiation is demonstrated through marriage.

As one discovers more primitive forms of the human family, they broaden out into larger groups which, like the clan, may also be considered as political groups. To transport into the unknown regions of pre-history the family form derived from the biological family in order to develop from it by natural or artificial association the above-mentioned groups, is a hypothesis that not only cannot be proved but is rendered even more improbable by the zoologists' refusal, as we have seen, to accept such a genesis even for animal societies.

Furthermore, while the extension and structure of primitive family groups do not exclude the existence within them of families limited to their biological members—a fact as incontestable as that of bisexual reproduction—the form thus arbitrarily isolated can tell us nothing of the psychology of the family and cannot be assimilated to the forms of the family that exist at present.

In fact, on examination the reduced group that makes up the modern family does not appear as a simplicifaction but rather as a contraction of the institution of the family. It has a very

complex structure and in many respects is better understood through the empirically known institutions of the ancient family than on the hypothesis of an elementary family no one has ever encountered. This is not to say that it is over-ambitious to look in this complex form for a meaning that unifies it and perhaps directs its evolution. This meaning can in fact be discovered when in the light of our comparative examination we grasp the profound restructuring which has led the institution of the family to its present day form. We see at the same time that this form must be attributed to the dominant influence marriage has assumed—an institution that must be distinguished from the family. We can then appreciate Durkheim's excellent term for designating it—the conjugal family.

CHAPTER ONE

THE COMPLEX; A CONCRETE FACTOR IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

The human family must be understood within the quite particular order of reality constituted by social relations. If in order to ground this principle we have recourse to the conclusions of sociology, it is because the order of reality in question is that science's true object, even though the sum of facts by which it illustrates the principle goes well beyond our subject. The principle is thus placed on a plane where it has its fullest objectivity. In this way it will allow us to give the results of contemporary psychological research their true value. Since this research breaks with academic abstractions and aims at dealing with the concrete, both in the observation of behaviour and in psychoanalytic experience, this research, especially when it is directed towards the facts of 'the family as a psychical object and occurrence', never objectifies instincts but only complexes.

This finding is not simply a contingent stage that can be further reduced as our theory develops. We have to recognise in it expressed in psychological terms, though ones consistent with the principle set out at the beginning, an essential characteristic of our object of study, namely its conditioning by cultural factors at the expense of natural ones.

General Definition of the Complex; The complex links in a fixed form a group of reactions that can involve all organic functions ranging from emotion to object-adapted behaviour.

What defines the complex is that it reproduces a certain reality of the environment and that it does this in a two-fold way; (1) In its form it represents this reality by what characterised it as objectively distinct at a given stage in psychic development; this stage specifies its origin. (2) In its activity it repeats in real life the reality that has been thus fixed every time there occur the particular experiences that demand a higher objectification of this reality; these experiences specify the conditioning of the complex.

This definition in itself implies that the complex is dominated by cultural factors; in its content, which represents an object; in its form, which is linked to a real live state of objectification; finally in its manifestation of an object to a deficiency with regard to the present situation. Therefore, under the three-fold aspect of a knowledge relationship, of a form of affective organisation and of an experience of the impact of the real world, the complex is understood with reference to the object. Now, every objective identification must be communicable, that is, it has to be founded on a cultural criterion: and it is also by cultural means that it is most often communicated. As for the individual integration of objectifying forms, this is the work of a dialectical process that makes each new form arise from the conflicts between the preceding one and the real. In this process we must recognise the character that specifies the human order, namely the subversion of every instinctual fixation from which arise the fundamental and infinitely variable forms of culture .

Complex and instinct; Though the complex in its fullest expression springs from culture, and even though this is an essential consideration for anyone who wants to account for the

psychic facts of the human family, this is not to say there is no relationship between complex and instinct. But it is a curious fact that because of the obscurities that expose the concept of instinct to the criticism of contemporary biology, the concept of the complex, though only recently introduced, proves to be better adapted to more sophisticated objects. We therefore reject the support that the inventor of the complex thought he could find in the classic concept of instinct and prefer to believe that by a theoretical about face, it is instinct that could today be clarified by a reference to the complex.

One could thus contrast point by point: (1) the relationship of knowledge implied in the complex with that co-naturality of the organism and its environment on which the enigmatic qualities of the instinct depend; (2) the broadly typical nature of the complex in relation to the laws of a social group with the generically typical nature of the instinct in its relation with the inflexibility of a species; (3) the protean manifestations of the complex which, under equivalent forms of inhibition, compensation, miscognition and rationalisation, express a stagnation in respect of the same object with the stereotyped phenomena of instinct whose activation is subject to the law of "all or nothing" and remains rigid in the face of variations in the real-life situation. Both stagnation in the complex and rigidity in the instinct will remain completely enigmatic as long as they are explained only in terms of the postulate of vital adaptation, which is in fact a mechanistic disguise for the doctrine of finality. These problems demand the use of those richer concepts made necessary by the study of psychic life.

The Freudian complex and the imago: We have defined the complex in very broad terms that do not exclude the possibility of the subject's being conscious of what it represents. But it was as an essentially unconscious factor that it was first defined by Freud. Its unity is in fact very striking in the form in which it is revealed as the cause of psychic effects which are not directed by consciousness: parapraxes, dreams, symptoms. These

effects have a character which is so distinct and contingent that they oblige us to admit as a fundamental element of the complex a paradoxical entity: an unconscious representation that is known as the imago. Complexes and imago have revolutionised psychology and, especially, the psychology of the family, which has shown itself to be the chosen terrain of the most stable and typical complexes. From having been a simple subject of moralising commentary the family has thus become the object of concrete analysis.

Complexes have however been shown to play the role of "organisers" in psychic development. They thus control those phenomena which seem to consciousness to be most closely integrated into the personality; so that it is not only the justifications for emotional attitudes but also objectifiable rationalisations that find a motivation in the unconscious. At the same time the importance of the family as a psychical object and occurrence is increased.

This theoretical progress has encouraged us to give the complex a general formula that will allow it to include conscious phenomena of similar structure. Among these are the sentiments that can be seen as conscious emotional complexes; family sentiments in particular are often the inverted image of unconscious complexes. Also included are delusional beliefs in which the subject affirms that a complex is an object of reality; we shall demonstrate this in family psychoses in particular. We shall study complexes, imagos, sentiments and beliefs in their relationship with the family and in function of the psychic development that they organise, beginning with the child who is reared in the family and ending with the adult who reproduces it.

1 THE WEANING COMPLEX

The weaning complex fixes the feeding relationship in the psyche in the parasitic form that the needs of the human infant being demand. It represents the primordial form of the maternal imago.

It consequently forms the basis of the most archaic and stable sentiments uniting the individual to the family. We touch here upon the most primitive complex in psychic development, the one that must come to terms with all the complexes that will come later. It is all the more striking to see that it is entirely dominated by cultural factors and, therefore, right from this primitive stage, radically different from an instinct.

Weaning as ablactation; There are however two characteristics that do make it very like an instinct. On the one hand the weaning complex appears with such broadly similar traits throughout the human species that it can be seen as generic. On the other hand it represents in the psyche a biological function that is exercised by anatomically well differentiated system—lactation. So it is quite understandable that attempts have been made even in the case of humans to consider as instinctive the fundamental behaviour that links mother and child. But this is to neglect an essential characteristic of instinct: its manifestly physiological regulation which can be seen in the fact that the maternal instinct in the animal ceases to act with the completion of suckling.

In man, on the contrary, it is a cultural regulation that conditions weaning. Culture is predominant, even if one limits weaning to the cycle of ablactation properly so-called; although it is true that this is linked to the physiological period of the mammary gland common to all classes of mammals. Although the regulation we observe in the real world appears clearly unnatural in only the most regressive practices— which have not

incidentally all gone out of fashion—it would really be an incredible illusion to look to physiology for an instinctive basis for those regulations, better fitted to nature, than the ideal of the most advanced cultures imposes on weaning as much as on any other custom. In fact weaning, through any one of the contingent operations it involves, is often a psychic trauma, whose individual effects, such as anorexia nervosa, oral addictions and gastric neuroses, reveal their causes to psychoanalysis.

Weaning, a crisis of the psyche: Traumatic or not, weaning leaves in the human psyche the permanent trace of the biological relationship it interrupts. This biological crisis is duplicated by a psychic crisis that is doubtless the first whose resolution has a dialectical structure. For the first time, it seems, a vital tension is resolved into a mental intention. By this intention weaning is either accepted or refused. The intention is certainly extremely elementary/ since it cannot even be attributed to the ego, which is still in a rudimentary state; acceptance or refusal cannot be conceived of as choices, since in the absence of an ego which affirms or denies these are not contradictory. But as co-existent and contrary poles, they determine an essentially ambivalent attitude even though one of them prevails. With the crises that assure the continuity of development, this primary ambivalence is resolved into psychic differentiations of an increasingly higher dialectical level and of a growing irreversibility. The original preference will change its meaning several times and because of this may undergo

very diverse fates; it will however re-establish itself again, with its own tempo and tone, by the way in which it sets its stamp both upon these crises and upon the new categories with which each crisis endows lived experience.

The Imago of the Maternal Breast

It is the refusal of weaning that gives to the complex its positive basis as the imago of the nursing relationship that it tends to re-establish. The content of this imago is given by the sensations of the first stages of life, but it only has form in so far as these sensations are mentally organised. Now, since this stage occurs before that at which an object can be formed, it would seem that these contents cannot be represented in consciousness. However, they reproduce themselves there in mental structures that serve, as we have seen, as the model for later psychic experiences. They will be evoked anew by association when these later experiences occur, though they will be inseparable from the objective contents they will have informed♦ Let us analyse these contents and these forms.

The study of the behaviour of early childhood allows us to affirm that exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive sensations are not yet sufficiently co-ordinated by the twelfth month to enable the infant fully to recognise his own body nor, correlatively, to have a notion of what is external to it.

The exteroceptive form—human presence; Very early on, however, certain exteroceptive sensations are sporadically isolated in perceptual unities. These elements of objects correspond, as might be expected, to the earliest affective interests. We have an example of this in the precocity and special quality of the child's reaction to the approach or

departure of the people who take care of him. We must, however, make special mention as a structural fact the reaction of interest that the child manifests towards the human face; it is extremely precocious and can be observed from the first days, even before motor co-ordination of the eyes has been achieved. This fact cannot be separated from the progress that will make the human face so valuable as an expression of the psyche. This value, though social, cannot be seen as simply conventional. The re-activated power, often of an ineffable kind, that the human visage assumes in the mental content of psychosis seems to testify to how archaic its meaning is.

In any case, these preferential reactions allow us to grasp in the child both a certain very precocious knowledge of that presence fulfilling the maternal function and the role of causal traumatism that in certain neuroses and character disorders can be played by a substitute for that presence. This very archaic knowledge, for which the Claudelian pun of "co-naissance" seems to be tailor-made, is barely distinguishable from affective adaptation. It remains totally implicated in both the satisfaction of the needs of early childhood and the typical ambivalence of mental relations adumbrated at that stage. When we consider the infant at the breast, this satisfaction displays the signs of the greatest plenitude with which human desire can be fulfilled.

Proprioceptive Satisfaction—Oral Fusion: The proprioceptive sensations related to sucking and grasping are evidently at the base of the ambivalence of lived experience which arises from the situation itself: the being who absorbs is completely absorbed, and the archaic complex responds to him in the maternal embrace. We shall not speak here as Freud did of auto-erotism, since the ego is not yet constituted, nor of narcissism, since there is not yet any image of the ego; even less shall we speak of oral erotism, since the nostalgia for the nourishing breast, on which the psychoanalytic school has been so equivocal, is only connected with the weaning complex by means of its re-structuring by the Oedipus complex. It could be called "cannibalism", but a cannibalism that is fusional, ineffable, at once active and passive, one that still survives in games and in symbolic words and that in the most highly developed love recalls the desire of the larva. We recognise in these terms the link with reality on which the maternal imago is based.

Interoceptive discontent—the pre-natal imago: This base itself cannot be detached from the chaos of the interoceptive sensations from which it emerges: anxiety, the prototype of which appears in the asphyxia of birth; cold, which is linked to the nakedness of the skin; and the labyrinthic discomfort to which the satisfaction of being rocked corresponds. This triad organises the painful tone

of organic life which for the best observers dominates the first six months of the human being. These primordial discontents all have the same cause: an insufficient adaptation to the breakdown of the conditions of environment and nourishment that constitute the parasitic equilibrium of intra-uterine life.

This conception agrees with what psychoanalytic practice has found to be the basic content of the imago of the maternal womb: beneath the phantasies of the dream and the obsessions of the waking state there appear with an impressive precision the images of the intra-uterine habitat and of the anatomical threshold of extra-uterine life. With our knowledge of the data of physiology and of the anatomical fact of the non-myelinisation of the higher nervous centre in the newborn child, it is however impossible to see birth, as certain psychoanalysts do, as a psychic trauma. So that this form of the imago would remain an enigma if the post-natal state of man did not manifest by its very discontent that the organisation of posture, of muscle tone and of balance appropriate to intra-uterine life still remains after that life has come to an end.

Weaning: The Specific Prematurity of Birth

We can see that the delay in dentition and walking and the correlative delay in the majority of other systems and functions, determines in the child a total vital powerlessness that lasts beyond the first two years. Should this fact be associated with those that give man's subsequent somatic development its exceptional character in comparison with other animals of the same class, namely, the length of the period of childhood and the delay of puberty? Whether or not it should be, we must not hesitate to recognise a positive biological deficiency in those early years, nor to consider man as an animal who is born prematurely. This view explains both the general nature of the complex and its independence of the accidents of ablactation. The latter—which is weaning in its strictest sense—gives the first and also the most adequate psychic expression to the more

obscure imago of an earlier, more painful weaning that is of greater vital importance: that which, at birth, separates the infant from the womb, a premature separation from which comes a malaise that no maternal care can compensate for. Let us recall here the well-known paediatric fact of the very special affective retardation observed in children delivered before term.

Maternal sentiment: Thus constituted, the imago of the maternal womb dominates the whole of the life of man. However, because of its ambivalence it can be fully saturated in the reversal of the situation that it represents, something that strictly speaking is only realised in the unique experience of mothering. In suckling, embracing and contemplating her child the mother at the same time receives and satisfies the most primitive of all desires. Even the pain of giving birth can be understood as a representative compensation for the first of the affective phenomena to appear: the experience of anxiety which begins with life itself. Nothing but the imago which is imprinted at the deepest level of the mind by the congenital weaning of man can explain the power, richness and duration of maternal sentiments. The realisation of this imago in consciousness provides a woman with a privileged psychic satisfaction, while its effect on the behaviour of the mother preserves the child from the abandonment which would be fatal for him.

In opposing complex and instinct we do not deny that the complex has some biological foundation, and in defining it by certain ideal relationships we still link it to its material foundation. This foundation is the function that

it fulfils in the social group; and this biological basis can be seen in the individual's vital dependence on the group. While instinct has an organic support and is nothing other than the regulation of this by a biological function, the complex has only occasionally an organic relationship, when it makes up for a biological deficiency by the regulation of a social function. This is the case in the complex of weaning. This organic relationship explains why the imago of the mother has a place in the depths of the psyche and why its sublimation is particularly difficult, as we can see in the attachment of the child to his mother's apron strings and in the sometimes anachronistic duration of this bond.

However, the imago must be sublimated so that new relationships can be introduced with the social group and new complexes integrated into the psyche. To the extent that it resists these new exigencies, which are those of the progress of the personality, the imago, which is salutary in its origins, becomes death bearing.

The Appetite for death: That the tendency to death is lived by men as the object of an appetite is a reality that analysis discovers at every level of the psyche. It fell to the inventor of psychoanalysis to recognise the irreducible character of this reality, but the explanation he gave it of a death instinct, startlingly brilliant though it is, is nevertheless self-contradictory; it remains true that genius itself in Freud yielded to a prejudice derived from biology that demanded that every tendency be referred to an instinct. But the tendency to death which specifies the human psyche can be explained in a satisfactory way by the conception that we are developing here, namely, that the complex as a functional unity of the psyche does not arise from biological functions but rather from a congenital insufficiency of these functions.

This psychic tendency towards death in the original form that weaning gives to it, can be seen in those special kinds of suicide which are characterised as non-violent; while at the same time we can see in it the oral form of the complex:

the hunger-strike of anorexia nervosa, the slow poisoning of certain oral addictions and the starvation diet of gastric neuroses. The analysis of these cases shows that by-abandoning himself to death the subject is attempting to rediscover the imago of his mother. It is quite generic as can be seen in burial practices, certain types of which clearly display the psychological meaning of a return to the mother's womb; and as we can also see it in the connections established between the mother and death, both in magical techniques and in the conceptions of ancient theology, and finally as we can observe it in every psychoanalytic experience that is pushed far enough.

The domestic bond; Even when it is sublimated, the imago of the maternal womb continues to play an important psychic role in the life of the subject. That form of it which is most withdrawn from consciousness, that of the pre-natal habitat, finds an adequate symbolisation in the dwelling house and in its threshold, especially in the more primitive forms of the cavern and the hut.

In this way everything that constitutes the domestic unity of the family group, to the degree that the individual is capable of considering it separately, for him becomes the object of an affection distinct from that uniting him to each member of the group. In this way also the abandonment of the securities provided by the family economy have the effect of a repetition of weaning, and for the most part it is only when this occurs that the complex is sufficiently liquidated. Every return, even partial, to these securities can release ruinous consequences in the psyche that are out of all proportion to the practical benefits of such a return.

To reach completion every personality requires this new weaning. Hegel proposed that the individual who does not struggle to be recognised outside the family group goes to his death without having achieved a personality. The psychological meaning of this thesis will appear in the course of our study. As regards personal dignity, the family can only promote the individual to that of a name-bearing entity and it can only do this at the hour of his burial.

The nostalgia for wholeness; The saturation of the complex is the foundation of maternal feelings; its sublimation contributes to family sentiments; its liquidation leaves traces in which it can be detected since it is this structure of the imago that remains the basis of the mental progress that has remodelled it. If we had to define the most abstract form in which it is found, we would characterise it as a perfect assimilation of totality to being. In this formula, a bit philosophical in appearance, will be recognised the nostalgias of humanity; the metaphysical mirage of universal harmony; the mystical abyss of affective fusion; the social utopia of totalitarian dependency—all derived from the longings for a paradise lost before birth and from the most obscure aspirations for death.

2 THE COMPLEX OF INTRUSION

Jealousy; Archetype of all Social Sentiments

The complex of intrusion represents the experience that the primitive subject goes through, usually when he sees one or several of his fellow human beings share in domestic relationships with him; or to put it another way when he realises that he has siblings. The conditions that govern its appearance and tdepextérlpo-fcaràablfee extension that different cultures give to ahé dDmeHtiiBridnaupcontigencies, the first of which is the place fate allots to the subject in the order of births. This could be called the dynastic position he occupies before any conflict arises: he is either the one in possession or the usurper.

Infantile jealousy has long struck observers: "I saw with my own eyes," says St Augustine, "and I observed carefully, a young child devoured by jealousy: he was not yet able to speak, yet he could not prevent himself from going pale at the bitter spectacle of his brother at the breast" (Confessions, I, VII). This observation which so astonished our moralist remained for a long while nothing more than a rhetorical theme that could be used for all sorts of apologetic ends.

By demonstrating the structure of infantile jealousy, experimental observation of the child and psychoanalytic investigation have brought to light its role in the origins of sociability and consequently of knowledge itself as human knowledge. The critical point revealed by these investigations is that jealousy at its most fundamental does not represent biological rivalry but rather a mental identification.

Mental identification: From the observation of children between the ages of six months and two years who are paired off and left to play spontaneously without the presence of a third person one can affirm the following fact: between children brought together in this way diverse reactions appear within which communication appears to take place. Among these reactions one type can be distinguished in that one can recognise in it an objectively definable rivalry: this involves a certain adaptation between the subjects of their postures and gestures, namely a conformity in their alternation and a convergence in their series that organises them into provocations and ripostes that allows us to affirm, without prejudice to the consciousness of the subjects,

that they are aware of an alternative in the situation, of there being two possible ways out. Depending on the extent of this adaptation one can admit the beginning at this stage of a recognition of a rival, that is to say of "an other" as object. Now, even though such a reaction can appear at a very early age, it is determined by a condition that is so dominant that it appears univocal, that of an upper limit to the age-difference between the subjects. This limit is restricted to two and a half months in the first year, the period now under consideration, and remains very strict, even though it increases with age.

If this condition is not fulfilled the observed reactions between the children thus confronted have a completely different value. Let us examine the most common of these reactions: parade, seduction and despotism. Though the two partners figure in it, the relationship that characterises each one of them is observed to be not a conflict between two individuals but a conflict in each subject between two opposed and complimentary attitudes. This bi-polar manner of participation is constitutive of the situation itself. To understand this structure just consider the child who displays himself and the one who follows him with his gaze: which of the two is more of a spectator? Or observe the child who lavishes his attempts at seduction on another: who is seducing whom? Finally, in the case of the child who enjoys the proof of the domination he exercises and the one who takes pleasure in submitting to them, who is the more reduced to servitude? Here then we have a paradox: each partner confuses the other's role with his own and identifies with him; but each can sustain the relationship with a quite insignificant degree of participation from the other and so live out the whole situation on his own, as we can see from the sometimes total discordance of their behaviour. All this is to say that the identification specific to social behaviour at this stage is based on a sense of the other that one is bound to misunderstand without a correct conception of its totally imaginary value.

The imago of a fellow human: What then is the structure of this imago? We are given a first indication by the condition of a very limited discrepancy in age that we recognised above as

necessary for a real adaptation between the partners. If we refer this to the fact that this stage is characterised by transformations of the nervous structure so rapid and profound as to overcome individual differences, this condition is seen to amount to the requirement of a similarity between the subjects. It seems that the imago of the other is linked to the structure of one's own body, especially to the structure of its relational functions, by a certain objective similarity.

The doctrine of psychoanalysis allows us to get closer to the problem. It shows us that the sibling is the chosen object of libidinal demands that are homosexual at the stage we are studying. But it also stresses the confusion in this object of two affective relationships, love and identification, whose opposition will be fundamental at later stages.

This original ambiguity reappears in adults and can be best grasped in the passion of jealous love. It can be recognised in the powerful interest that the subject takes in the image of the rival. Even though this interest is expressed as hatred, that is as negative, and is motivated by the supposed love object, it seems nevertheless that the subject fosters it in the most gratuitous and costly manner; and it often dominates the sentiments of love themselves to such a point that it has to be interpreted as the essential and positive interest of the passion. This interest confuses within itself identification and love, and though it only appears in a veiled form in the thinking of adults it confers an incorrigible quality on the passion it sustains, which makes it akin to an obsession. The very high

degree of aggressiveness encountered in the psychotic forms of this passion is constituted much more by the negation of this singular interest than by the rivalry that appears to justify it.

The meaning of primary aggressivity But it is most especially in the primitive fraternal situation that aggressivity shows itself to be secondary to identification. Freudian doctrine remains uncertain on this point. The Darwinian idea that struggle is at the very origin of life is still given great credence among biologists. But we should no doubt also recognise here the less criticised prestige of a moralising emphasis transmitted in such banalities as: homo homini lupus. Against this, the suckling relationship in the young clearly signifies a temporary neutralisation of the conditions of the struggle for food. This signification is even more obvious in the case of humans. The manifestation of jealousy in relation to suckling, a classical view illustrated by the above quotation from St. Augustine needs to be interpreted with caution. In fact jealousy can still manifest itself long after the subject has been weaned and is no longer in a situation of vital competition with his brother. The phenomenon seems therefore to require as a precondition a certain identification with the sibling's state. Moreover, analytic doctrine, by characterising as sado-masochistic the typical libidinal tendency of this stage, certainly underlines that here aggressiveness dominates the affective economy, but it also makes clear that it is always both active and passive, that is, underpinned by an identification with the other who is the object of the violence.

It is worth recalling that the role masochism plays as an intimate lining to sadism was highlighted by psychoanalysis and that it was the enigma that masochism constitutes in the economy of the vital instincts that led Freud to affirm the existence of a death instinct.

By following out the idea that as we have indicated above, designates the miseries of human weaning as the source of the desire for death, one will recognise in primary masochism the dialectical moment in which by his first games the subject assumes the reproduction of this misery and in that way sublimates and overcomes it. This is indeed how the primitive games of children appeared to the shrewd eye of Freud. The joy that the infant experiences in throwing an object out of his field of vision and then, when the object has been found again, in tirelessly renewing the exclusion signifies that it is indeed the pathetic nature of weaning that the subject is once again inflicting on himself. Once he was obliged to undergo it, but now he triumphs over it by actively reproducing it.

The division thus begun in the subject can be completed through identification with the sibling, because it provides the image which fixes one of the poles of primary masochism. Thus the non-violence of the primordial form of suicide engenders the violence of the imaginary murder of the sibling. But this violence is not connected with the struggle for life. The object that aggressivity chooses for its primitive death games is in fact some toy or scrap which is biologically indifferent. The subject does away with it gratuitously as if for the sheer pleasure of it and thus brings to completion the loss of the maternal object. The image of the unweaned sibling only attracts a special aggression because it repeats in the subject the imago of the maternal situation and with it the desire for death. This phenomenon is secondary to identification.

The Mirror Stage

Affective identification is a psychic function whose originality has been established by psychoanalysis, especially in the Oedipus complex, as we shall later see. But the use of the term at the stage we are studying remains ill-defined in the doctrine. That is why I have attempted to fill the gap with a theory of this identification whose genesis I describe by using the term 'mirror stage'.

The stage thus designated corresponds to the final phase of weaning, that is, to the end of those six months during which the dominant psychic feeling of discontent associated with a retardation in physical growth expresses the prematurity of birth that underlies weaning in the human being. Now, the recognition by the subject of his image in the mirror is a phenomenon that is doubly significant for the analysis of this stage: it appears after six months and its study demonstrates the tendencies that at that time constitute the subject's reality. Because of these affinities, the mirror image is a good symbol of this reality: of its affective value, illusory like the image, and of its structure in that it reflects the human form.

The perception of the form of a fellow creature as a mental unity is correlative in the living being to its level of intelligence and sociability. In herd animals the imitation of a signal shows it in a reduced form. Its infinite riches is shown in the echomimetic and echopraxic structures seen in both the monkey and man. It is the primary meaning of the interest that both show in their mirror image. But even though their behaviour in regard to this image—attempting to reach out and grasp it manually—appears similar in both, these grasping games have a preponderant place for man only for a short time at the end of the first year. This is the age Buhler calls "the age of the chimpanzee", because it is then that man achieves a level of instrumental intelligence equivalent to that of the animal.

A higher power of the mirror image: But in fact this perceptual phenomenon which is seen in human beings from the sixth month on, henceforth appears in a completely different form, and resembles rather an illuminating intuition: against the background of an attentive suspension of activity there is a sudden manifestation of adaptive behaviour (in this case a gesture referring to some part of his body) followed by a jubilant expenditure of energy which objectively indicates triumph. This twofold reaction enables us to glimpse a sense of understanding which cannot be put into words. I think these characteristics express the secondary meaning that this phenomenon receives from the libidinal conditions accompanying its appearance. These conditions are nothing more than the psychological tensions built up during the months of prematurity and which appear to translate a twofold break in the vital order: a break in that immediate adaptation to the milieu which defines the world of the animal in its connaturality, and a break in that unity of vital functioning which in the animal puts perception at the service of the drive.

In man the discordance at this stage of both drives and functions is only a consequence of the prolonged incoordination of these systems. This results in a stage that is affectively and mentally constructed on the basis of a proprioceptivity that presents the body as fragmented. On the one hand, a psychic interest is displaced onto tendencies aiming at a certain reconstitution of the body; on the other hand, reality, subjected at first to perceptual fragmentation whose chaos reaches even into its categories-spaces, for example, being as disparate as the successive static states of the child—is organised by reflecting the forms of the body which provide in a certain sense the model for all objects.

Here is an archaic structure of the human world whose deep-rooted vestiges have been revealed by the analysis of the unconscious: phantasies of the dismemberment and dislocation of the body, of which the phantasies of castration are only an image highlighted by a particular

complex; the imago of the double whose fantastic objectifications, produced by different causes at different ages of life, reveal to the psychiatrist that it evolves with the growth of the subject; finally the anthropomorphic and organic symbolism of objects which psychoanalysis discovered in such an extraordinary way in dreams and symptoms.

The tendency by which the subject restores his own lost unity has a place from the beginning at the centre of consciousness. It is the source of the energy that governs his mental progress—a progress whose structure is determined by the predominance of visual functions. But although the search for his affective unity encourages in the subject the production of forms in which he represents his identity to himself, the most intuitive form is given at this phase by the mirror image. What the subject welcomes in it is its inherent mental unity. What he recognises in it is the ideal of the imago of the double. What he acclaims in it is the triumph of a salutary tendency.

The narcissistic structure of the ego: The world appropriate to this phase is thus a narcissistic world. In so describing it we are not simply evoking its libidinal structure by the same term to which from 1908 on Freud and Abraham assigned the purely energetic meaning of investment of libido in the body. We also wish to penetrate its mental structure and give it the full meaning of the Narcissus myth. Whether this meaning is taken to indicate death—a vital insufficiency from which this narcissistic world grows; or the mirror image—the imago of the double is central to it; or the illusion of the image—this world, as we shall see, has no place for others.

The perception of the activity of others does not in fact suffice to break through the subject's affective isolation. As long as the image of one's fellow only plays its primary role, and is limited to the function of expression, it triggers in the subject similar emotions and postures, at least to the degree that the current structures of his functional systems allow. But while undergoing this emotional or motor suggestion, the subject does not distinguish himself from the image itself. On the contrary, in the discordance characteristic of this phase the image only adds the temporary intrusion of an alien tendency. Let us call this a narcissistic intrusion: the unity it introduces into the tendencies will nevertheless contribute to the formation of the ego. However, before the ego affirms its own identity it confuses itself with this image which forms it, but also subjects it to a primordial alienation.

It can be said that from this origin the ego retains the ambiguous structure of the spectacle clearly seen in the situations of despotism, seduction and parade described above and gives their form to the sado-masochistic and scopophilic drives (desire to see and to be seen), which are essentially destructive of the other. Let us also remark that this primary intrusion helps us to understand all the projections of the completed ego, whether they manifest themselves as mythomaniac in the child whose personal identity is still vacillating, as transitive in the paranoiac whose ego has regressed to an archaic stage, or as understanding when they are integrated into the normal ego.

The Drama of Jealousy: The Ego and the Other Person

The ego is constructed at the same time as the other while the drama of jealousy is being acted out. Because there is in the

subject a tendency which draws satisfaction from relating to his mirror-image, the ego is a dissonance introduced into this specular satisfaction. It implies the introduction of a third object which replaces the affective confusion and the ambiguities of the mirror stage with the competition of a triangular situation. And so the subject, who through identification is committed to jealousy, arrives at a new alternative where the fate of reality is played out. Either he goes back to the maternal object and insists on refusing the real and on destroying the other; or he is led to some other object and accepts it in the form characteristic of human knowledge, that is, as a communicable object, since competition implies both rivalry and agreement. But at the same time, he recognises the other with whom he will either fight or enter into a contract. In short he discovers both the other person and the object as socialised phenomena. Here again human jealousy is distinguished from the immediate rivalry of the biological order, since it forms its objects rather than being determined by them. Jealousy shows itself then as the archetypal social sentiment.

The ego conceptualised in this way is not constituted in all its essentials before the age of three years; to be so constituted it must possess the character of objectivity fundamental to human knowledge. What is remarkable is that this knowledge draws its richness and power from the biological deficits which characterise the origins of man. The primordial symbolism of objects favours both their extension beyond the limits of vital instincts and their being perceived as instruments. Socialisation by jealous sympathy is the foundation of both their permanence and their substantiality.

Such are the essential traits of the psychic role of the fraternal complex. Here are some of its applications.

Conditions and effects of fraternity: The sibling's traumatising role results from his intrusion. The fact of his appearance and its timing determine its meaning for the subject. The intrusion originates from the newcomer and disturbs the one in possession. As a general rule in a family it results from a birth, and in principle it is the older child who suffers.

The reaction of the sufferer to the trauma depends on his psychic development. If he is surprised by the intruder while still disorganised by weaning, this experience will be reactivated every time he sets eyes upon him. He then regresses in a way that will reveal itself according to the fate of the ego as a schizophrenic psychosis or as a hypochondriacal neurosis; or he may react by the imaginary destruction of this monster and this will result in either perverse impulses or obsessional guilt.

If on the contrary the intruder does not arrive until after the Oedipus complex, he is most often adopted by the assumption of a parental identification, which, as we shall see, has a greater affective density and a richer structure. He is then no longer an obstacle or a reflection for the subject but a person worthy of love or hate. Aggressive drives are sublimated into tenderness or severity.

The sibling also provides the archaic model of the ego. Here the elder one has the active role since he is more developed. The more this model is in conformity with all the drives of the subject, the happier will be the synthesis of the ego and the more real will be the forms of objectivity. Is this formula confirmed by the study of twins? We know that many myths impute to them heroic powers by which there is restored in reality the harmony of the mother's womb, but at the price of fratricide. In any case it is through one's fellow creature that object and ego both come into being. The more the subject is able to assimilate from his partner, the more he strengthens both his personality and his objectivity, the guarantors of his future efficiency.

But the group of siblings differing in age and sex favours the most discordant identifications of the ego. The primary imago of the double on which the ego models itself at first appears to be dominated by fantasies of form, as we can see in the phantasy of the phallic mother common to both sexes, or in the phallic double of the neurotic woman. It is all

the easier for it to become fixated on atypical forms in which accessory attributes can play as great a role as organic differences. Depending on whether the pressure of the sexual instinct is sufficient or not, this identification of the narcissistic phase can be observed either to generate the formal demands of homosexuality or of a sexual fetishism, or, in the system of the paranoiac ego, to become objective as an external or internal persecutory agent.

The connections of paranoia with the fraternal complex can be seen in the frequency of the themes of filiation, usurpation and spoliation, just as its narcissistic structure reveals itself in the more paranoid themes of intrusion, of influence, of splitting, of the double, and of all the delusional transmutations of the body.

These connections explain the fact that the family group which is reduced to the mother and siblings presents a psychic complex in which reality tends to remain imaginary or at most abstract. Clinical experience shows that in fact the group composed in this way is very favourable to the development of psychosis and that one finds it in the majority of cases of délires a deux.

3 THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

It was with his discovery of oedipal events in the analysis of neuroses that Freud uncovered the concept of the complex. The Oedipus complex is concerned with many of the psychic relationships dealt with throughout this work and therefore particularly deserves our study and criticism: our study because it more precisely defines the psychic relationships within the human family; and our criticism since Freud presents this psychological entity as the specific form of the human family and subordinates all social variations of the family to it. The methodical order we propose here for considering both mental structures and social facts will lead to a revision of the complex that will allow us to situate the paternalistic family in

history and to further clarify the neurosis of our time.

The schematic form of the complex: Psychoanalysis has revealed in the child genital drives that reach their apogee in the fourth year. Without going any further into their structure here, let us simply say that they constitute a sort of psychological puberty which is obviously very premature in relation to physiological puberty. By attaching the child through sexual desire to the closest object that normally offers him a presence and an interest, namely the parent of the opposite sex, these drives provide the basis of the complex, while their frustration forms its core. Even though this frustration is inherent to the essential prematurity of the drives, the child links it to a third object which the same conditions of presence and interest normally indicate to him as being the obstacle to their satisfaction, namely the parent of the same sex.

The frustration he undergoes is in fact most commonly accompanied by an educative suppression whose aim is to prevent any fulfilment of the drives, especially in masturbation. On the other hand, the child acquires a certain insight into the situation that is forbidden to him, as much by the discrete but diffuse signs that betray to his sensibility the relationship between his parents, as by the untimely accidents that unveil it to him. By this double process the parent of the same sex appears to the child both as an agent of sexual prohibition and as an example of its transgression.

The tension thus set up is resolved, on the one hand, by a repression of sexual tendencies which will henceforth remain latent until puberty, making room for neutral interests eminently favourable for educational acquisitions and on the other hand, by the sublimation of the parental image which will perpetuate a representative ideal in consciousness and thereby guarantee that at the moment of puberty psychic and physiological attitudes will coincide. This double process has a fundamental genetic importance because it remains inscribed in the psyche in two permanent agencies: the one that represses is called the super-ego, and the one that sublimates is called the ego-ideal. They represent the completion of the oedipal crisis.

The objective value of the complex: This essential schema of the complex corresponds to a great quantity of experiential data. The existence of infantile sexuality is no longer disputed. Moreover, even though it came to light historically through those after-effects of its evolution that form the neuroses, it is accessible to the most immediate observation, and its miscognition throughout the ages is a striking proof of the social relativity of human knowledge. The psychological agencies that, under the names of super-ego and ego-ideal, have been isolated in the concrete analysis of neurotic symptoms, have revealed their scientific value in the definition and explanation of the phenomena of personality. Here we have a dimension of positive determinants that can account for a mass of anomalies in human behaviour and, at the same time, abolish for these disorders any reference back to the organic order which, even though it is derived from abstract principle or is simply

mythological, still takes the place of experimental method for a whole medical tradition.

As a matter of fact, the prejudice that attributes an epiphenomenal, that is, causally redundant, character to the psychic order was encouraged by an inadequate analysis of the factors of that order. It is precisely in the light of what is defined as the oedipal situation that particular accidents in the history of the subject take on a meaning and an importance that enable us to link them to a particular trait of his personality. We can be even more specific and say that when these accidents affect the oedipal situation as traumas in its evolution, they are repeated rather as effects of the super-ego, while the accidents that affect it in such a way as to make its constitution atypical are reflected instead in the forms of the ego-ideal. In this way a great number of disorders, many of which appear at the level of elementary somatic functions, have found their theoretical and therapeutic explanation as inhibitions in creative activity or as inverted forms of the sexual imagination.

The Family According to Freud

The discovery that developments as important for man as the suppression of sexuality and psychic sexual identity were subject to the regulation and accidents of a psychic drama in the family, brought a most precious contribution to the anthropology of the family group and especially to the study of the prohibitions that this group universally formulates and whose object is the sexual commerce between certain of its members. As a result Freud formulated a theory of the family very early on. It was founded on a dissymmetry, which appeared at the beginning of his investigations, of the position of the two sexes with regard to the Oedipus complex. The process which goes from oedipal desire to its suppression only appears in the simple form expounded above in the case of the male child. And so, it is constantly the male who is taken as the subject in didactic expositions of the complex.

Oedipal desire does in fact appear to be much more intense in the boy and, therefore, is directed to the mother. Further, the mechanism of suppression displays characteristics that appear justifiable only if in its typical form it is exercised by the father on the son. This is accomplished by the castration complex.

The myth of castration: This suppression is brought about by a double affective movement of the subject: aggressivity against the parent with whom his sexual desire puts him in a position of rivalry and then a secondary fear that his aggression will be reciprocated. Now, a single phantasy underpins these two movements, one so remarkable that it has been isolated with them in what is known as the castration complex. While this term may be justified by the aggressive and suppressive aims that appear at this moment of the oedipal complex, it bears little relation to the phantasy that gives it its singularity.

This phantasy consists essentially in the mutilation of a bodily member, that is to say in an act of brutality whose aim can only be the castration of a male. But the apparent reality of this danger, as well as the fact that the threat was actually formulated by certain educational traditions, was to lead Freud to conceive it as initially experienced at its face value and so to recognise the prototype of oedipal suppression in the terror inspired in a male by a male-in fact by the father.

In taking this path Freud was supported by sociological facts. Not only has the prohibition of incest with the mother a universal character that cuts right across the infinitely diverse and often paradoxical kinship relations marked by primitive cultures as being under the taboo of incest, but, further, this prohibition is always expressly formulated, whatever the level of moral conscience in a culture, and its transgression is always condemned. This is why Frazer recognised in the taboo of the mother the primary law of humanity.

The myth of the original patricide: This is how Freud made the theoretical leap whose abuse we noted in the introduction. From the conjugal family observed in his subjects he passed to a hypothetical primitive family conceived of as a horde that a male dominated by his biological superiority, keeping the nubile females for himself. Freud based this on the observable link between taboos and observances with regard to the totem, which is alternately an object of inviolability and of sacrificial orgies. He imagined a drama of the murder of the father by the sons followed by a posthumous consecration by the murderers, prisoners of an indissoluble rivalry, of his power over the women. This primordial event is represented as the source of the taboo of the mother and of all moral and cultural traditions.

Even if this reconstruction of events were not undermined by the fact that it begs the question—it attributes to a biological group the possibility of recognising a law, which is precisely what it is trying to prove—its very premises, which themselves are supposedly biological, namely the permanent tyranny exercised by the chief of the horde, would be reduced to an increasingly uncertain chimera as our knowledge of primates advances. Above all, the universally present traces and widespread survival of a matriarchal family structure, and the existence in its domain of all the fundamental forms of culture and especially of an often very severe suppression of sexuality, make clear that the foundations of the human family are not dependent on the power of the male.

Despite this we still think that the enormous harvest of facts that the Oedipus complex has allowed us to objectify during the past fifty years can play a much greater part in the clarification of the psychological structure of the family than would appear from the rather hasty intuitions that we have just presented.

The Functions of the Oedipus Complex: A Psychological Revision

The Oedipus complex marks every level of the psyche; but psychoanalytic theorists have not unambiguously defined the functions it fulfils there. This is because they have not

sufficiently distinguished the different developmental planes on which they explain it. They think that the complex is the axis along which the evolution of sexuality is projected onto the constitution of reality, but in fact in the case of man these two planes diverge. This divergence has a specific incidence which admittedly the theoreticians recognise when they speak of the suppression of sexuality and the sublimation of reality, but which ought to be integrated into a more rigorous conception of these structural relations since the role of maturation that the) complex plays on these planes can be only approximately treated as parallel.

The Maturation of Sexuality

The psychic apparatus of sexuality first appears in the child in forms that are extremely aberrant with respect to its biological ends, and the succession of these forms shows that it is by a progressive maturation that it comes to conform to the genital organisation. This maturation of sexuality conditions the Oedipus complex by forming its fundamental tendencies, but inversely the complex favours it by directing it towards its objects.

The oedipal movement is brought about by a triangular conflict in the subject. We have already seen that the interplay of tendencies derived from weaning produces a formation of this sort. It is the mother who, as nourishment to be absorbed or even as the womb into which one is reabsorbed, is the first object of these tendencies, and is also the first object to be offered to oedipal desire. We can thus understand how it is that this desire is better defined in the male, but also that it offers him a singular opportunity for the reactivation of weaning tendencies, that is to say for sexual regression. These tendencies do not simply constitute a psychological impasse; they also oppose, particularly here, the attitude of

exteriorisation which is in conformity with the activity of the male.

This is in complete contrast to the other sex, where these tendencies have a possible outcome in the biological destiny of the subject; here the maternal object, by diverting some of the oedipal desire, tends to neutralise the potential of the complex and thereby its sexualising effects. But in imposing a change of object the genital tendency is better detached from the primitive tendencies—and it does this all the more easily since it does not have to reverse the attitude of interiorisation inherited from these narcissistic tendencies. So one is led to the ambiguous conclusion that in comparing the two sexes the sharper the formation of the complex, the more uncertain does its role in sexual adaptation seem to be.

The Constitution of Reality

What can be seen here is the influence of the psychological complex on a vital relationship and it is through this that it contributes to the constitution of reality. This contribution cannot be dealt with in terms of an intellectualist psychogenesis; it consists in bestowing a certain affective depth to objects. It is a dimension which, though forming the basis of all subjective understanding, would not be distinguished from it as a phenomenon if the clinical experience of mental illnesses did not help us to grasp it as such, by proposing a whole series of degraded forms at the limits of comprehensibility.

Even though this dimension constitutes a norm of lived experience, it can only be reconstructed by metaphoric intuitions—density, which confers existence on an object, and perspective, which gives us a sense of its distance and inspires in us a respect for the object. It manifests itself in the vacillations of reality that fecundate a delusion: when the object tends both to be confused with the ego and to be reabsorbed into fantasy, or when it appears decomposed according to one of the feelings that

form the spectre of unreality. These range from feelings of strangeness, of déjà vu, of jamais vu, and include false recognition, illusions of one's double, feelings of divination, of participation, of being influenced, of intuitions of signification, and finally culminate in the twilight of the world and the abolition of affectivity, formally designated in German as object - loss (Objektverlust).

Psychoanalysis explains these very diverse qualities of lived experience by variations in the quantity of vital energy that desire invests in the object. Even though this may appear to be a simple verbal formula it corresponds for psychoanalysts to a datum of their practice; they take this investment into account in the "transferences" that operate in their treatment. It is on the capacity of the subject for transference that they have to decide whether treatment is indicated or not. And so, while in the symptoms listed above they would recognise the signs of an overly narcissistic investment of libido, the formation of the Oedipus complex still appears to provide proof of a sufficient investment for "transference" and to indicate the moment at which it emerges.

This role of the Oedipus complex is held to be correlative to sexual maturation. The attitude established by the genital tendency is then supposed to crystallise in a normal way a vital relationship with reality. This attitude is characterised by the terms gift and sacrifice—terms which are certainly high-sounding but whose meaning remains ambiguous, hesitating as it does between defence and renunciation. By means of these terms this daring conceptualisation finds itself drawing comfort from moralising notions; in the passage from captivation to oblativity the vital test and the moral test are too easily confused.

This conception is able to define for itself an analogical psychogenesis, one that is in conformity with the most striking flaw in analytic doctrine—the neglect of the structural in favour of the dynamic. Despite this, analytic experience itself contributes to the study of mental forms by revealing their link—either as conditions or as solutions—with affective crises. It is by differentiating the formal influence of the complex that one can establish a more clearcut relationship between its functions and the structure of the drama essential to it.

The Repression of Sexuality

Even though the Oedipus complex marks the high point of infantile sexuality, it is also the source of the suppression that reduces its images to a latent state until puberty. While it gives to reality a life-like density, it is also the moment of sublimation which in man opens up dimensions of reality that extend beyond self-interest.

The forms under which these effects are perpetuated are called super-ego or ego-ideal, according as they are unconscious or conscious to the subject. They reproduce, it is said, the imago of the parent of the same sex, the ego-ideal thus contributing to the sexual conformity of the psyche. But the imago of the father is, in this doctrine, considered to have a prototypical role in these two functions because of the dominant role of the male.

According to this view the suppression of sexuality is, as we have seen, based on the phantasy of castration. If the doctrine links it to a real threat, this is above all because Freud, while showing genius in his recognition of dynamic tendencies, remained closed to the notion of the autonomy of forms because of his traditional atomism. Thus, when he observed the existence of the same phantasy in the little girl, and the image of a phallic mother in both sexes, he was forced to explain these facts as arising from precocious revelations of male domination, revelations which he believed made the little girl long for virility and the child think of his mother as virile. Even though this origin may find a basis in identification, it demands the use of such an excessive number of mechanisms that it seems to be erroneous.

Phantasies of the fragmented body: Material drawn from psychoanalytic experience suggests a different interpretation. The phantasy of castration is as a matter of fact preceded by a whole series of phantasies of the fragmentation of the body that go, in regressive order, from dislocation and dismemberment through gelding and disembowelling to devoration and burial.

Examination of these phantasies reveals that the series can be understood as a form of penetration, in both a destructive and investigative sense, and is directed at the secret of the maternal womb; while the more archaic these phantasies are the more this relationship is experienced by the subject as ambivalent. But the investigators who have

best understood the maternal origin of these phantasies (Melanie Klein) are only interested in the symmetry and the extension they contribute to the formation of the Oedipus complex by revealing, for example, a longing for maternity in the little boy. To my mind their main interest lies in the evident unreality of their structure: examination of these phantasies as found in dreams and in certain impulses enables us to affirm that they relate to no real body but to a heteroclitite mannequin, to some baroque doll, to a cluster of bodily members in which we can recognise the narcissistic object whose genesis we mentioned above. This is conditioned by the fact that in man imaginary forms of his own body precede its mastery as well as by the defensive value the subject attaches to these forms as a protection against the anxiety of being bodily torn apart which results from his prematurity.

The maternal origin of the archaic super-ego: The castration phantasy is linked to this same object: its form, born before any mapping out of the body, before any discernment of a threat from an adult, does not depend upon the sex of the subject and, far from being subjected to the formulas of an educative tradition, it determines them. It represents the defence that the narcissistic ego, identified with its mirror-image, opposes to the renewal of the anxiety which tends to unsettle it at the first moments of the Oedipus complex. This crisis is caused less by the eruption of genital desire in the subject than by the object it reactualises, namely the mother. The subject responds to the anxiety this object awakens by reproducing the masochistic rejection through which he overcame his primordial loss, but he does this in accordance with the structure he has acquired, that is to say, in an imaginary localisation of the tendency.

This account of the genesis of sexual suppression has its sociological correlate. It is expressed in the rituals by which primitive people show that this suppression is at the very root of the social bond: celebration rituals which while liberating sexuality also, by their orgiastic forms, designate here a moment of affective reintegration into the Totality; and rituals of circumcision which while sanctioning sexual maturity show that the person accedes to it only at the price of bodily mutilation.

In order to define the genesis of suppression on a psychological level, we have to recognise the phantasy of castration as the imaginary game that conditions it and the mother as the object that determines it. It is the radical form of the counterdrives [contrepulsions] which are revealed to analytic experience as constituting the most archaic kernel of the super-ego and as representing the most massive suppression. With the differentiation of this form, that is to say, with the progress by which the subject comes to see the suppressive agency in the authority of the adult.

this force is divided up. Otherwise there would be no way of understanding a fact that apparently contradicts the theory that the rigour with which the super-ego inhibits the functions of the subject tends to establish itself in inverse proportion to the real severities of education. Even though the super-ego already receives some traces of reality from maternal suppression alone (the discipline of weaning and of sphincter control), it is in the Oedipus complex that it goes beyond its narcissistic form.

The Sublimation of Reality

Now we turn to the role of the complex in the sublimation of reality. In order to understand it we must start from the moment which the doctrine shows to be the resolution of the drama, that is to say from the form known as identification that it discovered there. It is in fact because of an identification of the subject with an imago of the parent of the same sex that the super-ego and the ego-ideal can be seen to have traits that correspond to particular characteristics of this imago.

The doctrine sees here the emergence of a secondary narcissism. It does not distinguish this identification from narcissistic identification: in both cases there is assimilation of the subject to an object. The only difference it sees is in the constitution, with the advent of oedipal desire, of a more real object corresponding to a better-formed ego. The frustration of this desire is said to effect the subject's return, according to hedonistic principles, to his primary assimilative voracity; just as the formation of the ego is said to effect an imperfect introjection of the object. The imago, while it imposes itself on the subject, is only juxtaposed with the ego, since as unconscious and ideal it is subject to a twofold exclusion.

The originality of oedipal identification: A more structural analysis of oedipal identification allows us nevertheless to recognise its more distinctive form. What appears first of all is the antinomy in the functions played by the parental imago in the subject. On the one hand it inhibits the sexual function,

though in an unconscious way, since experience shows that the action of the super-ego against the repetitions of the tendency remains just as unconscious as the tendency remains repressed. On the other hand the imago preserves this function, but protects it from its own miscognitions, since what the ego-ideal represents in consciousness is the preparation of the way for its future return. So, while the tendency can be resolved into two major forms recognised by analysis as unconsciousness and miscognition, the imago itself appears in two structures whose divergence from one another defines the first sublimation of reality.

However, it is not sufficiently emphasised that the object of identification is in this case not the object of desire, but the object opposed to it in the oedipal triangle. Mimetic identification becomes propitiatory. The object of sado-masochistic participation is separated out from the subject and takes its distance from him in a new ambiguity of fear and love. But in this step towards reality the primitive object of desire appears to have been conjured away.

To my mind this fact defines the originality of oedipal identification: it seems to indicate that in the Oedipus complex it is not the moment of desire, but rather the moment of the subject's narcissistic defence that erects the object in its new reality.

This moment, while giving rise to an object whose position defines it as an obstacle to desire, shows it surrounded by an aura of transgression that is experienced as dangerous. It appears to the ego both as a support for its defences and

as an example for its triumph. That is why this object is normally seen in the context of the double in which the ego first identified itself, and by means of which it can still confuse itself with an other. It brings security to the ego by reinforcing this context, but at the same time it puts it in opposition to it as an ideal which alternately exalts the ego and depresses it.

This moment of the Oedipus complex provides the prototype of sublimation as much because of the role the masked presence of the tendency plays in it as because of the form it gives the object. The same form is in fact perceptible in every crisis in which human reality appears with that density whose enigmatic character we have mentioned above. It is this light of wonderment that transfigures an object by dissolving its equivalences in the subject and proposes it no longer as a means to the satisfaction of desire, but as a pole for the creations of passion. It is by reducing such an object once more that every progress in deepening experience is realised.

A series of functional antinomies in the subject is thus constituted by the major crises of human reality, the result of which is to contain the indefinite potentialities of its progress. While the function of conscience appears to express primordial anxiety and the function of equivalence to reflect the narcissistic conflict, the function of example appears to be the original contribution of the Oedipus complex.

The imago of the father; The very structure of the oedipal drama designates the father to give the function of sublimation its purest and therefore most eminent form. The imago of the mother in oedipal identification betrays the interference of primordial identifications; it marks both the ego-ideal and the super-ego in their forms and in their ambivalence. Just as the suppression of sexuality in the case of the little girl more readily imposes this mental fragmentation onto bodily functions by which hysteria can be defined, so also the sublimation of the maternal imago tends to change into both a feeling of repulsion because of its

weakened position and into a systematic concern for the subject's mirror-image.

To the extent that the imago of the father is dominant, it polarises in both sexes the most perfect forms of the ego-ideal. It is enough to indicate that these forms produce the ideal of virility in the boy, and in the girl the ideal of virginity. On the other hand in the diminished forms of this imago we can emphasise physical lesions, especially those that present this imago as disabled or blind, as diverting the energy of sublimation from its creative direction and favouring its withdrawal into an ideal of narcissistic integrity. The death of the father, at no matter what stage of development it occurs and according to the level of the Oedipus complex that has been achieved, tends similarly to fixate the progress of reality and bring it to a halt. By relating a large number of neuroses and their relative gravity to causes such as this, experience contradicts the theoretical orientation that would designate the major influence in the production of neuroses as being the threat emanating from a powerful father.

The Complex and Sociological Relativity

Even though psychological analysis has shown that the Oedipus complex has to be understood in terms of its narcissistic antecedents, this does not mean that the complex can be grounded independently of sociological relativity. The most decisive source of its psychic effects results from the fact that the imago of the father concentrates in itself the functions of repression and sublimation. But this in turn is socially determined by the existence of the paternalistic family.

Matriarchy and Patriarchy

In matriarchal cultures family authority is not represented by the father but ordinarily by the maternal uncle. Malinowski, an ethnologist who has been guided by his knowledge of

psychoanalysis, has successfully explored the psychic effects of this phenomenon; the maternal uncle exercises his social sponsorship as guardian of the family taboos and initiator into tribal rituals, while the father, freed from all repressive functions, can exercise a more friendly supporting role as master of skills or tutor of courage in difficult enterprises.

This separation of functions brings about a different psychic equilibrium, which the author attests is shown in the absence of neurosis among the groups he observed in the islands of north-west Melanesia. This equilibrium shows convincingly that the Oedipus complex is relative to a social structure, but it does nothing to authorise the mirage, against which the sociologist must always defend himself, of an earthly paradise. To the harmony it brings there must be opposed the stereotyped characteristics that in such cultures marks all creations of the personality from art to morality. We must also recognise in this other side of the coin, and in conformity with the present theory of the Oedipus complex, just how far social suppression dominates the impulse to sublimate when the two functions are separated.

On the contrary it is because the paternal imago is invested with the function of suppression that it can project the original force of suppression into those very sublimations destined to overcome it. The Oedipus complex is productive precisely because it binds the progress of these functions together into such an antinomy. This antinomy plays a part in the individual drama, and we shall see its presence confirmed there by its decomposing effects, but its progressive effects go way beyond this drama, integrated as they are into an immense cultural patrimony including normal ideals, juridical statutes and creative inspiration. The psychologist cannot neglect these forms which, by concentrating in the conjugal family the conditions of the functional conflict of the Oedipus complex, reintegrate the social dialectic generated by this conflict into psychological progress.

It is already a datum of our analysis that the study of these forms can be understood historically; in fact owing to a structural problem the light of historical tradition is fully

cast only on the annals of patriarchal society, while only in its penumbra—to which Bachofen's field of investigation was limited—does it illuminate matriarchal societies that everywhere underlie ancient cultures.

The openness of social bonds: Here we approach what Bergson defined as a critical moment in the foundations of morality. For him the "total obligation", by which he designates the bond that closes the human group on its own coherence, exists primarily as a biological defence. In opposition to it he recognises a transcendent life-force in every movement that opens up this group by universalising the bond. Here we have a double source discovered by an abstract analysis which, though doubtless opposed to formalistic illusions, remains within the realm of abstraction. But just as the psychoanalyst and the sociologist can recognise a concrete form of primordial obligation in the prohibition of the mother, so also can they demonstrate a real way of "opening" the social bond through paternal authority and affirm that by the functional conflict of the Oedipus complex this authority introduces into repression an ideal in the form of a promise.

If they examine the sacrificial rites by which primitive cultures, even those that attained a high level of social organisation, with the cruelest rigour reproduced phantasies of a primary relationship with the mother (human victims dismembered or entombed alive), they will read in many of the myths that the advent of paternal authority brought with it a tempering of primitive social suppression. This meaning can be seen in the mythical ambiguity of the sacrifice of Abraham where, moreover, it is also expressly linked to a promise. It appears no less clearly in the myth of Oedipus, provided we do not neglect the episode of the Sphinx, which offers a no less ambiguous representation of the emancipation from matriarchal tyranny and the decline of the ritual of royal murder. No matter what form they take all these myths are situated at the dawn of history, a long way from the birth of humanity from which they are separated by the immemorial duration of matriarchal cultures and by the stagnation of primitive groups.

From this sociological viewpoint the phenomenon of prophetism, which led Bergson to history because it was produced in the Jewish people more than anywhere else, can be understood by the privileged situation created for this people through their holding to patriarchy in the midst of all the groups given to matriarchal cults and by their convulsive struggle to maintain the patriarchal ideal against the irrepressible seduction of these cultures. Throughout the history of patriarchal peoples we see a

dialectical affirmation in society of the exigencies of the person and of the universality of ideals. One proof of this is the progress of juridical forms that eternalised as much in terms of power as of consciousness (tant en puissance qu'en conscience) the mission conducted by ancient Rome and which was realised by the already revolutionary extension of the moral privileges of a patriarchy to the plebeian masses and then to the people of every race.

Modern Man and the Conjugal Family

Two functions in this process reflect on the structure of the family itself: first the tradition, in the patrician ideals, of privileged forms of marriage and second the apothetic exaltation which Christianity brought to the exigencies of the person. The Church integrated this tradition into the ethics of Christianity by giving prime importance in the marriage bond to the person's free choice, thus making the institution of the family take the decisive step towards its modern structure, namely the secret revolution that made marriage, and not the family, the predominant social fact. This revolution took place in the fifteenth century and this, along with the economic revolution, is the source of bourgeois society and of the psychology of modern man alike.

It is the relations the psychology of modern man has with the conjugal family that are available for study by the psychoanalyst. This man is really the only one that he has any experience of. And even though the psychoanalyst may discover in him the psychic reflection of the most original conditions of man, does this mean that he can pretend to cure his psychic weaknesses without understanding him in the culture that makes such heavy demands on him or even without understanding his own position face to face with this man at the extreme point of the scientific attitude?

Even less now than ever before can Western man hope to understand himself without taking into account the antinomies that constitute his relationship with nature and

society. How, without taking these into account, can he understand either the anxiety that man expresses in the feelings of a Promethean transgression of the conditions of his life, or the supreme efforts of conceptualisation by which he overcomes this anxiety and recognises that it is by dialectical crises that he creates both himself and his objects?

The role of the formation of the family; This subversive and critical movement by which man realises himself find its most active source in three conditions of the conjugal family.

Because the conjugal family incarnates authority in the next generation and in a family figure, it puts this authority within the immediate range of creative subversion. The most ordinary observation allows us to see this in the inversions children imagine in the order of generations, in substituting themselves for their parents or grandparents.

On the other hand in the conjugal family the psyche is formed as much by the image of the adult as by going against his constraints. This effect is produced by the transmission of the ego-ideal which in its purest form, as we have seen, is transmitted from father to son. It involves a positive selection of tendencies and attributes and a progressive realisation of ideals in the character. The phenomenon of families of eminent men is due to this psychological process and not, as it is claimed, to some supposed heredity recognised by essentially relational capacities.

Finally, and above all, the conspicuousness of sexual activity

among those who represent moral constraints, and especially the example of transgression of the primary prohibition by the imago of the father, lift the tension of the libido and the influence of sublimation to their highest degree.

Because it realises in the most human way the conflict of man with his most archaic anxieties; because it offers him the most authentic arena in which he can measure himself against the profoundest figures of his destiny; finally, because it puts the most complete triumph over his original slavery within reach of his individual existence, the complex of the conjugal family succeeds in creating superior forms of character, happiness and creativity.

By ensuring the most thoroughgoing differentiation of personality before the period of latency, the complex allows the social confrontations of this period to have their greatest efficacy in the rational formation of the individual. It might even be said that educative action during this period reproduces the interplay of narcissistic equivalences in which the world of objects was first born in a more stable reality, and in the superior sublimations of logic and justice. The more diverse and the richer the realities unconsciously integrated into family experience, the more formative for reason will be the work of their reduction.

So, although in the mental conditions for creativeness psychoanalysis uncovers a revolutionary ferment that can only be grasped in a concrete analysis, it recognises that the family structure has a power to produce it which goes beyond any educational rationalisation. It would be worthwhile proposing this fact to the theoreticians of a social education with totalitarian pretension, so that no matter what camp they belong to each one can draw the conclusions he desires.

The decline of the paternal imago; The role of the imago of the father can be grasped in a striking way in the formation of most great men. Its literary and moral influence in the classical era of progress, from Corneille to Prudhon, is worth noting. And the ideologists who during the nineteenth century were the most

subversive critics of the paternalistic family were not the ones least marked by it.

I am not one to bewail the so-called loosening of family ties. Is it not significant that the family should have become reduced to its biological group to the degree that it integrated the most advanced forms of cultural progress? But I do think that a great many psychological consequences follow the social decline of the paternal imago. This decline is conditioned by the worst effects of social progress on the individual. It can be seen most clearly in our day in the collectivities that have suffered most from these effects through economic recession and political catastrophes. Was not this fact formulated by the head of a totalitarian state as an argument against traditional education? This decline is even more closely linked to the dialectic of the conjugal family, since it is the result of a relative growth in matrimonial demands—something that is very obvious, for example, in American life.

Whatever its future this decline constitutes a psychological crisis. It may even be that the emergence of psychoanalysis itself is linked to this very crisis. The sublime hazard of genius is perhaps not sufficient in itself to explain that it was at Vienna—at that time the centre of a state that was the melting pot of the most diverse forms of the family, from the most archaic to the most developed, from the last agnatic grouping of Slav peasants, through feudal and merchant paternalism, to the most reduced form of the petit bourgeois and to the most decadent forms of marital instability—that the son of a Jewish patriarch discovered the Oedipus complex. In any case, the forms of neurosis dominating the end of the last century revealed that they were intimately linked with the conditions of the family.

These neuroses seem to have evolved in the direction of a character complex since the time of the first Freudian discoveries. Because of the specificity of its form and its universality—it is the kernel of the majority of neuroses—this must be recognised as the great neurosis of our time. Our experience leads us to designate its principle determinant in the personality of the father which is always lacking in some way or another, whether he be absent or humiliated, divided or a sham. It is this lack which, as explained by our theory of the Oedipus complex, exhausts instinctual energy and vitiates the dialectic of sublimation. Impotence and a Utopian spirit are the sinister godmothers who watch over the cradle of the neurotic and imprison his ambition, either because he stifles in himself those creations expected of him by the world into which he comes, or because in the object against which he proposes to revolt he fails to recognise his own activity.

C H A P T E R T W O

FAMILY COMPLEXES IN PATHOLOGY

The function of family complexes in the psychoses is a formal one: family themes dominate in delusions because they are in conformity with the arrests in the ego and in reality that the psychoses bring about. In the neuroses complexes have a causal function: events within the family and family constellations themselves determine the symptoms and structures, on the basis of which the neuroses divide, introvert or invert the personality. These in a few words are the theses to be developed in this chapter.

It is clear that in describing the form of a psychosis or the source of a neurosis as familial, we understand this term in the strict sense of the social relations that this study has been trying to define and, by its objective fruitfulness, to justify. Therefore, what concerns purely biological transmission should, despite current neurological usage, be called 'hereditary' and not 'familial' in the strict sense of this term, even if the illness is psychological.

1 PSYCHOSES WITH A FAMILIAL THEME

It was such a concern for psychological objectivity that led me to study the psychoses when, as one of the first in France, I

attempted to understand them in their relationship to personality. What led me to adopt this point of view was the notion, becoming more and more popular at that time, that the whole of the psyche is involved in any lesion or deficit of any part of its systems or functions. This notion, demonstrated by the psychic disorders caused by localisable lesions, seemed to be even more applicable to the mental productions and social reactions of the psychoses, that is, to those delusions and impulsions that were supposedly partial but whose typical nature nevertheless evoked the coherence of an archaic ego and whose very discord revealed its internal law.

When it is remembered that these conditions correspond to what is commonly known as madness, it is evident that we are not talking here of a real personality, which would imply the communication of thought and responsibility for behaviour. One psychosis does in fact exist that I have isolated under the name of 'self-punishing paranoia' which does not exclude the existence of such a personality and is constituted not simply by relations with the ego but also by relations with the super-ego and the ego-ideal. But in this form of psychosis the super-ego imposes its most extreme punitive effects and the ego-ideal is characterised by an ambiguous objectification that favours repeated projections. The fact that I have been able to show the originality of this form, and have at the same time defined by its position a nosological frontier, is a result, even though a very limited one, which shows the fruitfulness of the point of view that guides my efforts.

Delusional forms of knowing; Progress in our investigations should help us to recognise the reconstitution of ego stages prior to personality in the mental forms that constitute the psychoses. If we characterise each of these stages by the stage of the object which is correlative to it, the whole normal genesis of the object can be found in a series of forms marked by arrests, in the objects of the delusion, whether this originates in the mirror relationship of the subject to the other person or in subjective appurtenances of the fragmented body.

It is remarkable that these objects manifest the primary characteristics that constitute human knowing—formal identity, affective equivalence, repetitive reproduction and

anthropomorphic symbolism—in forms which though admittedly stylised have a clearer outline because of the absence or the obliteration of the secondary integrations that give objects their mobility and individuality, their relativity and reality.

The limit of the reality of the object in psychosis, the point of retrogression of sublimation, seems to us to be given precisely at that moment which is indicated in our view by the aura of oedipal fulfilment. This is the setting-up of an object that has been produced, to use our own formulation, in an atmosphere of astonishment and wonder. This moment is reproduced by the phase that we believe to be always present and designate as the productive phase of the delusion: a phase in which objects transformed by an ineffable strangeness appear as shocking, enigmatic or full of meaning. It is in this reproduction that there collapses that superficially assumed conformism, by means of which the subject had until then masked the narcissism of his relationship to reality.

This narcissism is expressed in the forms of the object. These forms may develop before the revelatory crisis, just as oedipal objects are reduced to the structure of secondary narcissism—but here, in the first form to be considered, the object remains irreducible to any relation of equivalence, and the value of possessing it and its capacity to do harm outweigh any possibility of compensation or compromise: these are the vindictive delusions. In the second case the object's form can remain linked to the high point of the crisis as if the imago of the oedipal ideal was fixated at the moment of its transfiguration: except that here the imago is not assumed objectively by identification with the double, and the ego-ideal is repeatedly projected onto the object, which certainly serves as an example, but whose action is altogether external so that it becomes a living reproach whose censorship is like an omnipresent surveillance: this is the delusion of hypersensitivity to relationships. Finally, the object can rediscover, prior to the

crisis, the primary narcissistic structure at which its formation was arrested.

In this last case we can see the super-ego, which has not been repressed, not only express itself in the subject by repressive intentions, but also emerge in him as an object grasped by the ego, reflected in the fragmented traits of its formative influences. These may be represented by the castrating adult or the invasive brother, according as these were real threats or imaginary intrusions; this is the syndrome of interpretative persecution, whose object tends towards latent homosexuality.

At a further stage the archaic ego exhibits its fragmentation through the feeling of being spied upon, unmasked, or exposed, which is a fundamental feeling in hallucinatory psychosis. The double with whom the subject has identified himself appears in opposition to him; either as the echo of his thoughts and acts in the auditory forms of verbal hallucination, whose self-defamatory contents underline their evolutionary affinity with moral repression; or as a ghostly reflection of the body in certain forms of visual hallucination, whose suicide-type reactions show how close their archaic connection is with primordial masochism. Finally, the fundamentally anthropomorphic and organomorphic structure of the object emerges in the megalomaniacal participation through which the paraphrenic subject incorporates the world into his ego, affirming that he includes the Totality, that his body is composed of the most precious materials and that his life and functions sustain the order and existence of the Universe.

The Function of Complexes in Delusions

Family complexes play a remarkable role in the ego at these different stages at which it is brought to a standstill in psychosis, either as motives for the subject's reactions or as themes for his delusion. One could even organise under these two headings the integration of these complexes into the ego to bring it into line with the regressive series we have established above for the forms the object takes in psychosis.

Family reactions; In the psychoses morbid reactions are provoked

by family objects in proportion as the reality of these objects decreases and their imaginary influence grows. Some appreciation of this is gained if one begins with the conflict that puts the complaining person at odds electively with his family circle or spouse; then goes on to consider the meaning of the substitute figures for the father, for the brother and for the sister that the observer can recognise in the paranoiac's persecutors; in order, finally, to come to the secret romantic filiations or to the fantastic genealogies from the Trinity or Mount Olympus, in which the paraphrenic's myths are acted out. The objects constituted by family relationships thus show a progressive change: in affective value, when they are reduced to being simply pretexts for passionate exaltation; in individuality, when it is no longer recognised in their delusional repetition; and finally in their very identity, when it is no longer recognisable in the subject except as an entity exempt from the principle of contradiction.

Family themes; The importance of the family theme as a mode of expression for delusional consciousness is, in the series of psychoses, a function of a growing identification of the ego with a family object at the expense of the distance the subject maintains between himself and his delusional conviction. Some appreciation of this is gained if one begins with the relative contingency in the complainer's world of the complaints he brings against his own family; then goes on to consider the more and more existential importance assumed by the themes of spoliation.

usurpation and filiation in the conception the paranoiac has of himself; in order, finally, to come to the identification with some heir snatched from his cradle, with the secret spouse of some prince, or with the mythic personages of the all-powerful Father, the filial Victim, the universal Mother or the primordial Virgin, in which the ego of the paraphrenic affirms itself.

This affirmation of the ego becomes in fact increasingly uncertain the more it is integrated into the delusional theme. From being a remarkably communicative force within the complaint, it becomes reduced in a quite striking manner to a demonstrative intention in the paranoiac's reactions and interpretations until finally in the paraphrenic it loses itself in a disconcerting discordance between conduct and belief.

Hence, as the reactions become more and more related to phantasies and the delusion's theme becomes more and more objective, the ego tends to become confused with the expression of the complex while the complex tends to express itself in the intentionality of the ego. So that psychoanalysts usually say that complexes are conscious in psychoses whereas they are unconscious in neuroses. This is not a very rigorous formulation because, for instance, the homosexual meaning of psychotic tendencies is overlooked by the subject, even though it is expressed as a persecutory intention. Though only approximate, this formulation gives cause to wonder that the complexes were discovered in the neuroses where they are latent before being recognised in the psychoses where they are open to view. The family themes we have isolated in the psychoses are only the virtual and static effects of their structure, representations in which the ego is stabilised; so that they only show the morphology of the complex without revealing its organisation nor, consequently, the hierarchy of its characteristics.

This gave rise to the obvious artificiality that marked the classification of the psychoses according to delusional themes, and to the disrepute into which the study of these themes had fallen before psychiatrists were brought back to them by the impulsion towards the concrete set going by

psychoanalysis. In this way certain authors who thought themselves the least affected by that influence revived the clinical importance of certain themes, such as erotomania or delusions of filiation, by refocusing everyone's attention on them as romantic creations, thereby discovering that they contained all the characteristics of a structure. But only knowledge of the complexes can provide this research with both a systematic direction and a sureness and a sense of progress that goes far beyond the means of pure observation.

Consider, for example, the structure of the theme of the delusional interpretation of filiation which Serieux and Capgras defined as a nosological entity. By characterising it as arising from affective deprivation, manifested by the frequent illegitimacy of the subjects, and as a mental formation of the "roman de grandeur" type that normally appears between 8 and 13 years, the authors show the unity that exists between the fable of child substitution which may have been cultivated since that age, a fable which allows an old maid of the village to identify herself with somebody whom she resembles and whom life has favoured more, with the claims of the "False Pretender" which appear to have no greater justification than her's. But when the Pretender thinks he can bolster his rights by the minute description of an animal-like machine in whose stomach he was hidden during the initial kidnapping (this is the story the authors quote of de Richemont and his "extraordinary horse"), we believe that this phantasy which can certainly be seen as superfluous and be attributed to the mental debility of the subject, nevertheless, by its gestation-symbolism and by the place that the subject gives it in his delusion, reveals a more primitive structure of his psychosis.

The Determinants of Psychosis

It still has to be established whether the complexes which play the roles of motivation and of theme in the symptoms of psychosis have also a causally determining role. This issue is extremely obscure.

I must stress that even though I have tried to understand the symptoms psychogenetically, I am far from wanting to reduce the determinants of the illness to psychogenesis. On the contrary, by demonstrating that in paranoia its productive phase includes a hypnoic state that may involve confused, dream-like or twilight states of consciousness, I have underlined the necessity of some organic contribution to the mental withdrawal in which the subject is led into an delusional state.

I have also indicated elsewhere that the cause of the stagnation of sublimation, which is the essence of psychosis, must be looked for in some biological flaw in the libido. This means that I do believe in an endogenous determinant for psychosis. Here I have simply been trying to refute those pitiful pathogenic theories which today can no longer be seen as even putting the case for an "organic" origin of the illness. On the one hand they reduce the illness to some supposedly automatic mental phenomenon, which as such is incapable of explaining perceptual organisation, that is, of explaining the beliefs which one can in fact see in the most properly elementary symptoms of interpretation and hallucination. On the other hand the illness is conceived as being already formed in supposedly constitutional character traits. But these traits evaporate when the enquiry into these antecedents is required rigorously to define its terms and to subject the evidence of witnesses to careful scrutiny.

If some flaw can be discovered in the psyche before the psychosis, then the very sources of the vitality of the subject, the root of his most secret impulses or aversions is where we should be able to detect it. I think that particular evidence of this flaw can be found in the inexpressible distress that these subjects spontaneously acknowledge as having marred the first expressions of their genitality at puberty.

To link this hypothetical flaw to the facts formerly grouped under the rubric of degeneration or to more recent views on the biological perversions of sexuality, is yet again to enter into the problems of psychological heredity. Our discussion here is limited to an examination of strictly familial factors.

Familial factors; Elementary clinical experience shows a correlation between cases of psychosis and anomalies in the family situation. On the other hand, psychoanalysis, either by an interpretation of the clinical data or by an exploration of the subject which, since it cannot cure psychosis, must be very prudent, shows that the ego-ideal has been, often as a result of this situation, formed on the model of the sibling. This sibling-object, by switching the libido destined for the Oedipus complex on to the imago of primitive homosexuality, provides an

ideal which is too narcissistic not to bastardise the structure of sublimation. Moreover, a family group that is too closed in on itself tends to intensify the cumulative effects that, as we indicated in the analysis of the Oedipus complex, are characteristic of the transmission of the ego-ideal. But whereas in that case it normally tended towards a certain selectivity, its effects here tend rather towards degeneration.

Hence, while the aborted reality that we find in psychoses comes in the last resort from a biological deficit in the libido, it also reveals a drift away from sublimation, in which the role of the family complex is corroborated by numerous clinical facts.

Among these facts the following can be noted: anomalies of personality among the relations of paranoiacs which are consistent enough to justify the familiar psychiatric description of these families as breeding grounds for paranoia; the frequency of the transmission of paranoia in a direct family line, often with the aggravation of its form towards paraphrenia and the relative or even absolute temporal precession of its appearance in the descendant; finally, the almost exclusive choice of members of the family in cases of délires a deux, clearly demonstrated in some of the older collections such as Legrand du Saulle's work on persecutory delusions in which the breadth of the choice offered compensates for the lack of systématisation by a complete absence of partiality.

It is, I think, in these délires a deux that we can best grasp the psychological conditions that can play a determining role in psychosis. Excluding the cases in which the delusion emanates from a parent afflicted with some mental disorder that makes him a domestic tyrant, I have constantly encountered these delusions in the family groups that can be called incomplete, especially in the cases where the social isolation which the very incompleteness encourages has its maximum effect, namely in the psychological couple formed by a mother and a daughter, or by two sisters (see my study of the Papins) or, more rarely, by a mother and a son.

2 FAMILY NEUROSIS

Family complexes manifest themselves in a completely different way in the case of neurosis; here the symptoms display no relation to family objects or at most a contingent one. However, here the complexes do play a causal role whose reality and dynamics are diametrically opposed to the role that family themes play in the case of psychoses.

Neurotic symptomatology and individual drama; Freud's discovery of the complexes was revolutionary because, as a therapist more interested in the ill person than in the illness, he was attempting to understand him in order to heal him and, further, because he interested himself in what had been neglected as being simply the "content" of the symptoms, but which was in fact the most concrete aspect of their reality. So that he examined the object that provoked the phobia, the somatic system or function involved in hysteria and the representation or the affect preoccupying the obsessional subject.

In this way he managed to decipher the causes of symptoms in their very content. Although these causes appeared more complex with the progress of our experience, it is important not to reduce them to mere abstractions but instead to deepen that dramatic sense which, in their first formulation, really imposed itself as a response to the quest they had inspired.

Freud first attributed the origin of symptoms either to a sexual seduction to which the subject had been precociously subjected by more or less perverse manoeuvres, or to an early childhood scene in which what he had seen or heard had

initiated him into sexual relations between adults. Now, while on the one hand these events were shown to be traumatic since they divert sexuality towards abnormal tendencies, they demonstrated at the same time that a regular evolution of these different tendencies and their normal autoerotic satisfaction is proper to early childhood. It is for this reason that while, on the other hand, these traumas were shown to be commonly due to the initiative of a sibling or to the inadvertence of the parents, the child's participation in them proved to be increasingly active the more infantile sexuality, with its motives of pleasure or investigation, came to be confirmed. Thus these tendencies make their appearance already formed into typical complexes by the normal structure of the family, which provides them with their first objects. This is why no event precipitates these formations more than the birth of a sibling, since it is an enigma that stimulates the curiosity of the child, reactivates the primordial emotions of his attachment to his mother by the signs of her pregnancy and the sight of the care she lavishes on her newly born child and, finally, because in the father's being present with the mother it crystallises what the child guesses about the mystery of sexuality, what he feels about his own precocious sexual urges and what he fears from the threats that forbid him masturbatory satisfaction. Such is the family constellation as defined by its group structure and by a particular moment in its history, which, for Freud at least, forms the nodal complex of neuroses. From it he separated out the Oedipus complex, and below we shall see better how this origin determines the way he conceives the complex.

Let us conclude here by noting that a double system of causes is defined by the complex: the already mentioned traumas that owe their importance to the influence they have on its evolution, and the relationships within the family group that can determine what is atypical in its constitution. But although experience with neuroses makes manifest the frequency of anomalies in the family situation, we must, in order to define their effect, reconsider the way in which the symptoms are produced.

From the expression of the repressed to the defence against

anxiety: It might seem at first sight that the impressions that arise from the trauma determine the symptom by a simple relationship: a varying amount of the memory of these impressions, their affective correlations if not their representative forms, has not been forgotten but repressed into the unconscious; and the symptom, even though it is produced in

no less varied ways, can be understood as a function of the expression of the repressed which in this way manifests its permanence in the psyche. Not only could the symptom's origin be understood by interpretation using symbolism, displacement and other appropriate keys that suit its form, but the symptom disappeared to the extent that this understanding was communicated to the patient. That curing the symptom comes about by bringing the impression of its origin back to consciousness and by demonstrating the irrationality of its form to the subject—an inductive conclusion such as this rediscovers paths in the mind that had been opened up by the Socratic notion that man can free himself by knowing himself through the intuitions of reason. But it became necessary to make more and more substantial corrections to the simplicity and optimism of this conception ever since it became clear from experience that the subject opposes a resistance to the elucidation of the symptom and that an affective transference with the analyst as object is the force that comes to predominate as the treatment progresses.

What nevertheless remains from this stage is the notion that the neurotic symptom represents a moment in the subject's experience in which he is unable to recognise himself—a form of division of the personality. But as analysis came closer to grasping the way the symptom was produced, it no longer understood it as a clear function of expression of the unconscious and it came to be seen as having rather the more obscure function of a defense against anxiety. In his most recent views Freud considers this anxiety as the signal that, because it derives from a primordial situation of separation, is reawakened by anything resembling the

danger of castration. The subject's defense would therefore consist in taking this danger into consideration by prohibiting in a symbolic or sublimated form a certain access to reality even at the cost of the fragmentation of the personality caused by the symptom. This conception of the form of the symptom leaves only the residue that is its content to be understood by dynamic factors; and it tends to transform into structural terms the reference of the symptom to the subject by displacing the focus of attention onto the function of the symptom in relation to reality.

Specific deformations of human reality: The prohibitions in question here constitute relationships that, though inaccessible to conscious control and only revealing their negative form in behaviour, clearly reveal their intentionality to psychoanalysis, demonstrating the unity of an organised structure that ranges from apparent chance failures in functioning, through the fatality of "destiny" that frustrates our acts, to the constraint proper to our species that is due to feelings of guilt. Classical psychology erred, then, in believing that the ego, that object in which the subject is reflected as coordinated with the reality he recognises as outside himself, comprises the totality of the relations that determine the psyche of the subject. This error corresponds to an impasse in the theory of knowledge and to the failure, already mentioned, of a certain conception of morality.

In keeping with the psychology called rationalist, Freud conceived the ego as the system of psychic relations through which the subject subordinates reality to conscious perception; because of this he had to oppose to it, at first

under the name of super-ego, the system of unconscious prohibitions we have just defined. But it seems to me important to give theoretical balance to this system by joining to it the system of ideal projections which show in the imaginary forms of the ego—from the images of grandeur of the imagination, through the phantasies which polarise sexual desire, to the individual illusions of the will to power—a no less structural condition of human reality. Even though this system is not particularly well defined by the use of the term "ego-ideal", which is still confused with the super-ego, its originality can be adequately grasped by indicating that it constitutes, as a secret of consciousness, the very hold that the analyst has on the mystery of the unconscious. But it is precisely because it is too immanent to experience that it is the last thing to be separated out in the doctrine: the present work is a contribution to this task.

The existential drama of the individual: Although the psychic agencies that escape the control of the ego appear at first to result from the repression of sexuality in childhood, their formation reveals itself, as our experience grows, to be ever closer both in time and in structure to the situation of separation, shown by the analysis of anxiety to be primordial, which is the separation of birth.

Relating these psychic effects to such an original situation involves a good deal of obscurity. It seems to us that our conception of the mirror stage can help to clarify it by extending the hypothesised trauma of this situation to the whole stage of functional fragmentation which is determined by the special incompleteness of the nervous system. From this stage on we recognise the intentionalisation of the situation in two psychic manifestations of the subject: the assumption of the original state of dereliction in the game of repeatedly throwing away an object and the affirmation of the unity of the body in an identification with its mirror image. There is here a phenomenological nexus which, by manifesting in their original form those properties inherent to a human being of mimicking his mutilation and seeing himself as other than he is, also allows us to grasp their essential rationale in the servitudes proper to the life of man alone of having to overcome a specific threat and to owe his salvation to the interest of his fellow man.

Indeed it is beginning from an ambivalent identification with his fellow man that through jealous participation and sympathetic competition, the ego differentiates itself, in the common progress of "the other" and of objects. The reality inaugurated by this dialectical interplay will always retain the mark of the structural deformation of the existential drama that conditions it and that can be called the drama of the individual, with the accent this term receives from the idea of a specific prematurity.

But this structure receives its full differentiation only in the situation in which it was first recognised, in the conflict of infantile sexuality. This is understandable since only then does it accomplish its function with regard to the species; the psychic correction of sexual prematurity is ensured by the super-ego when it represses the biologically inadequate object that the first sexual maturation proposes to desire and by the ego-ideal when it brings about an imaginary identification that will orient the [subject's] choice towards the biologically adequate object when pubertal maturity comes.

The subsequent completion of the specific synthesis of the ego, at the so-called age of reason, gives its sanction to this moment; a personality is achieved with the characteristics of understanding and responsibility and an individual consciousness is reached within the subject by a certain turning away from the longing for the mother and towards the mental affirmation of his own autonomy. This moment is marked above all by an affective advance into reality, which is linked to the integration of sexuality into the subject. Here is a second nexus of the existential drama which the Oedipus complex initiates at the same time as it resolves the first one. Primitive societies, which regulate the individual's sexuality in a more positive manner, display the meaning of this irrational integration in the initiatory function of the totem, insofar as the individual identifies his own vital essence with it and ritually assimilates himself to it. The meaning of the totem, which Freud reduced to that of the Oedipus complex, appears to us rather to be the equivalent of one of its functions: that of the ego-ideal.

The degraded form of the Oedipus complex; Having carried out our project of relating the most abstract terms that the analysis of the neuroses has elaborated to their concrete— that is existential—implications, we can now better define the family's role in the genesis of these afflictions. This results from the twofold charge laid on the Oedipus complex: by its occasional incidence on narcissistic progress it is involved in the structural completion of the ego; and by the images it introduces into this structure it determines a certain affective animation of reality. The regulation of these effects is centred on the complex to the degree that the forms of social communion in our culture are rationalised—a rationalisation which it determines reciprocally by humanising the ego-ideal. On the other hand a disordering of these effects comes about because of the growing demands that this culture itself makes on the coherence and creative energy of the ego.

The uncertainties of and risks to this regulation grow in the measure that the same social progress that makes the family evolve towards the conjugal form increasingly submits it to individual variations. On this "anomy", which favoured the discovery of the complex, there depends the degraded form in which analysts have come to know it. We define this form as an incomplete repression of the desire for the mother, with the reactivation of the anxiety and the restless questioning inherent in the relationship of birth, and as a narcissistic bastardisation of the idealisation of the father, which in the oedipal identification emphasises the aggressive ambivalence immanent in the primary relationship to one's fellow man. This

form is the effect both of traumatic incidents in the complex and of anomalous relations between its objects. But to these two orders of causes there correspond respectively two orders of neuroses, those called transference neuroses and those called character neuroses.

Transference Neuroses

We must treat separately the simplest of these neuroses, that is, phobia in the form that it is most frequently observed in children, that which has an animal for its object.

This is only a substitutive form of the degradation of the Oedipus complex, in that a large animal directly represents the mother as childbearing, the father as threatening and the young sibling as an intruder. But it is worthwhile remarking that the individual, in attempting to defend himself against anxiety, has rediscovered in it the very form of the ego-ideal, which we have recognised in the totem, and through which primitive societies give a less fragile reinforcement to the sexual formation of the subject. The neurotic is however not following the trace of any "hereditary memory", but only the immediate awareness that, not without profound reason, man has of the animal as the model for natural relations.

The occasional repercussions of the Oedipus complex on narcissistic growth determine the other transference neuroses: hysteria and obsessional neurosis. Typical examples of these are seen in the incidents that, from the very beginning, Freud so masterfully specified as being at the origin of these neuroses. Their action shows that sexuality, like all psychic development in man, is subject to and specified by the law of communication. Whether as seductions or revelations, these incidents play their role insofar as the subject who is precociously surprised by them

in the process of narcissistically "patching himself up", links them to this process by identification. This process, a tendency or form according to the aspect of existential activity of the subject in which it is involved—the assumption of separation or the affirmation of his identity—will be eroticised as sado-masochism or as scopophilia (desire to see or to be seen). As such it will tend to undergo the repression corresponding to the normal maturation of the subject's sexuality and it will draw a part of the narcissistic structure into repression with it. This structure will then be lacking from the synthesis of the ego, and the return of the repressed answers to the constitutive effort by the ego to unify itself. The symptom is an expression of both the lack and the effort, or rather of their banding together in the primordial necessity of fleeing from anxiety.

By thus showing the origin of the division that introduces the symptom into the personality, having previously revealed the tendencies that it represents, Freudian interpretation rejoins the clinical analysis of Janet but goes beyond it in a dramatic understanding of neurosis as a specific struggle against anxiety.

Hysteria: The hysterical symptom which is the disintegration of a somatically localised function: paralysis, anaesthesia, pain, inhibition or scotomisation, gets its meaning from an organomorphic symbolism—which according to Freud is a fundamental structure of the human psyche that in a sort of mutilation manifests the repression of genital satisfaction.

This symbolism, since it is the mental structure by which the object participates in the forms of the body proper, should be thought of as the specific form taken by the psychic data of the fragmented body stage. In addition certain motor phenomena characteristic of this stage of development too closely resemble certain hysterical symptoms for us not to look to this stage for the origin of the well-known somatic compliance which must be admitted as a constitutional condition for hysteria. Here there is a mutilating sacrifice by which anxiety is hidden from view; and the effort to restore the ego is marked in the destiny of the hysteric by a repetitive reproduction of the repressed. We can therefore see why these subjects exhibit in their person the pathetic images of the existential drama of man.

Obsessional neurosis; As for obsessional symptoms in which Janet correctly recognised the dissociation of the ego's organising behaviour—obsessional apprehensiveness, obsessional impulsiveness, ceremonials, compulsive behaviour, obsessional brooding, scrupulosity or obsessional doubt—their meaning comes from the displacement of affect in representations, a process whose discovery is also due to Freud.

Freud also showed by what roundabout paths, even in repression itself, which the symptom manifests here most frequently in the form of guilt, the aggressive tendency that has undergone displacement comes to be formulated. This formulation is too like the effects of sublimation and the forms that analysis demonstrates in obsessional thinking—isolation of the object, causal disconnection of facts, retrospective annulation of events—appear too obviously as the caricature of the very forms of knowledge itself, for us not to look for the origin of this neurosis in the first identificatory activities of the ego; a fact which many analysts recognise when they stress the precocity of the ego's deployment in obsessional subjects. Besides, its symptoms come to be so little separated off from the ego that to designate them Freud introduced the term obsessional thinking. Here then the superstructures of the personality are used to mystify anxiety. The effort to restore the ego is expressed in the fate of the obsessional by a tantalising pursuit of a sense of unity within himself. So one can understand why these subjects, whose speculative faculties are often highly developed, in many of their symptoms display the naive reflection of the existential problems of man.

The incidence on the individual of family causes: We can see, therefore, that it is the incidence of the trauma in narcissistic development that determines the form of the symptom as well as its content. Since it is exogenous it is true that the trauma will at least fleetingly involve the passive before the active aspect of this development, and every division in the conscious identification of the ego seems to imply a foundation of functional fragmentation. This is confirmed by the hysterical substructure that analysis encounters every time it is able to reconstitute the archaic evolution of an obsessional neurosis. But once the first effects of the trauma have made a place for themselves in respect to one or other aspect of the existential drama—the assumption of separation or the identification of the ego—the type of neurosis grows clearer and clearer.

The advantage of this view is not only that it encourages the adoption of a higher viewpoint on the development of neurosis by postponing somewhat the recourse to constitutional factors which are always brought forward too readily; but also that it takes into account the essentially individual character of the determining factors of the illness. If indeed the neuroses, by the nature of the complications that are brought to them by the adult subject through secondary adaptation to its form and also through secondary defences against the symptom itself insofar as it is a bringing back of the repressed, show such a variety of forms that their catalogue is still to be completed after more than a third of a century of analysis, the same variety can be observed in their causes. One has to read the analytic case histories, especially the admirable studies published by Freud, to understand the infinite range of events that, as initial trauma or as occasions that reactivate it, can inscribe their effects in a neurosis, and with what subtlety the detours of the Oedipus complex can be made use of by sexual incidents: the excessive tenderness of a parent or inopportune severity can act as seductions, while the fear awakened by the loss of a parental object or the collapse of the prestige of his image can be revelatory experiences. No particular atypical form of the complex can be defined in terms of any constant effects. At most, one can note in broad terms a homosexual component in the tendencies repressed by hysteria and the general stamp of ambivalent aggressiveness towards the father in obsessional neurosis, these being moreover the manifest forms of the narcissistic subversion that characterises the tendencies that determine the neuroses.

The invariable importance of the birth of a sibling must also be seen in terms of narcissistic growth. While the overall direction of an analysis may formulate its impact on the subject in terms of a certain pattern—investigation, rivalry, aggressiveness or guilt—these patterns must not be taken to be homogeneous to what they represent in an adult, and their content must be rectified by recalling the

heterogeneity of the structure of the ego at this early stage. Therefore the importance of this event is to be measured by its effects on the process of identification. It often precipitates the formation of the ego and fixes its structure in a defence liable to manifest itself in avaricious or autoscopic character traits. Similarly the death of a sibling may be experienced as a deeply felt threat because of an identification with the other.

It can be concluded from this examination that while the sum of published cases demonstrates the family's causal role in these neuroses, it is impossible to relate each entity to any constant anomaly in the family system. This is true of at least the transference neuroses. The silence in their regard in a report on the family's causal role in the neuroses presented to the congress of French Psychoanalysts in 1936 makes the point. This is not to play down the importance of the family complex in the origin of these neuroses but to make clear their importance as existential expressions of the drama of the individual.

Character Neuroses

The so-called character neuroses, on the contrary, reveal certain constant relations between their typical forms and the structure of the family in which the subject has been raised. It was psychoanalytic research that allowed us to recognise as neurotic disorders of behaviour and interest that up to then had been explained simply as idiosyncrasies of character. Psychoanalysis discovered in them the same paradoxical effects of unconscious intentions and of imaginary objects that had been revealed in the systems of classical neurosis; and it established the same effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatment, thus substituting in both theory and practice a dynamic viewpoint for the inert notion of constitution.

The super-ego and the ego-ideal are in fact structural conditions of the subject. While in symptoms they manifest the disintegration that is produced by their interfering in the genesis of the ego, they may also find expression in an imbalance of their own particular agencies in the personality in a variation of what could be called the

personal formula of the subject. This idea can be extended to the entire study of character; and because it is relational it brings a foundation of pure psychology to the reclassification of its varieties, in the very domain that is predestined for their development. This is a further advantage over the uncertainty of the data to which constitutional explanations refer.

Character neuroses are expressed, then, by various hindrances in the activities of the individual and by imaginary impasses in his relations with reality. They attain a more purified form the more these hindrances and impasses are subjectively integrated with a sense of personal autonomy. This does not mean that they exclude all symptoms of disintegration, since they are more and more frequently encountered as underlying transference neuroses. Character neuroses are related to family structure because of the role that parental objects have in the formation of the super-ego and the ego-ideal.

The whole argument of this study is to demonstrate that the Oedipus complex presupposes a certain typical structure in the psychological relations between the parents, and we have in particular insisted upon the twofold role played by the father in representing authority and being at the centre of the revelation of sexuality. It is to this very ambiguity of his imago, as the incarnation of repression and the catalyst of an essential access to reality, that we have related the twofold progress typical in our culture, of a certain tempering of the super-ego and of a highly evolutionary orientation of the personality. Now, experience teaches us that the subject models his super-ego and his ego-ideal not so much on the ego of the parent as on the

homologous agencies of his personality. This means that in the process of identification which resolves the Oedipus complex the child is far more sensitive to the intentions of the parent that are affectively communicated to him than to what can be objectified in his behaviour.

This is what makes the neurosis of parents rate so highly among the causes of neuroses and, although our preceding remarks on the contingency essential to the psychological determinism of neurosis implies a great diversity in the form of the neurosis induced, the transmission tends to be similar because of the affective penetration that makes the psyche of the child open to the most hidden meaning of parental behaviour.

Reduced to the general form of disequilibrium, this transmission is clinically obvious but cannot be distinguished from the bare anthropological data of degeneration. Only analysis uncovers its psychological mechanism, and links certain constant effects with the atypical nature of the family's situation.

The self-punishing neurosis: A first atypical structure is thus definable in virtue of the conflict that the Oedipus complex implies, especially in the relationship of father to son. The fruitfulness of this conflict is due to the psychological selection that it ensures by making the opposition of each generation to the preceding one the very dialectical condition for passing on the paternal type. But at every breakdown of this tension in a given generation, whether due to individual weakness or to excessive paternal domination, the individual whose ego is

weakened in addition takes on the burden of an exaggerated super-ego. Different theoretical attempts have been made to formulate the notion of a family super-ego; it surely corresponds to an intuition of something real. In our view the pathogenic reinforcement of the super-ego in the individual is a function of both the rigours of patriarchal domination and the tyrannical form of the prohibitions that re-emerge to accompany the matriarchal structure at every stagnation of domestic ties. Religious ideals and their social equivalents here easily serve as vehicles of this psychological oppression insofar as they are used to promote the exclusivity of the family group and are reduced to signifying the demands of the family name or of the race.

It is when these different factors occur together that we get the most striking cases of these neuroses which are called self-punishing because of the often univocal preponderance of the psychic mechanism of the same name. By virtue of the very wide extension of this mechanism, these neuroses, which would be better differentiated if called neuroses of destiny, reveal themselves in the whole range of behaviour leading to failure, inhibition and decline in which psychoanalysts have been able to recognise an unconscious intention. Analytic experience suggests that the effects of self-punishment range ever wider and can even be determinants of organic illness. They throw light on the reproduction of certain more or less serious vital accidents that occur at the same age as they appeared in a parent, on certain sudden changes in activity or character when particularly important moments, such as the age of the death of the father, have been passed and on all sorts of identificatory behaviour perhaps including many cases of suicide which pose a particular problem in psychological heredity.

Introversion of the personality and schizonoia: A second atypical structure of the family situation is definable in the dimension of the psychic effects that the Oedipus complex assures

insofar as it presides over the sublimation of sexuality. We have tried to explicate these effects in terms of an imaginative animation of reality, and this provides an immediate intuitive justification of the systematic use made in psychoanalysis of the term 'libido'. Nothing other than the eternal entity of desire seems suitable for designating the variations that clinical experience uncovers in the interest that the subject takes in reality, and in the elan that sustains his conquest or his creativity. It is no less striking to observe that to the extent that this elan diminishes, the interest that the subject reflects back onto his own self is expressed in a more imaginary way, whether it relates to his physical integrity, his moral value or his social representation.

This structure of intrapsychic involution, which we designate as introversion of the personality, stressing that this term is used in slightly different senses, corresponds to the relationship of narcissism which we defined genetically as the psychic form that compensates for the deficiency specific to man's biological make-up. So that while there no doubt exists a biological rhythm that regulates the particular affective illnesses known as cyclothymic, their manifestation cannot be separated from an inherent expression of triumph or defeat. Similarly every integration of human desire is achieved in forms derived from primary narcissism.

We have however shown that two forms stand out in virtue of their critical role in this developments that of the double and that of the ego-ideal, the latter representing the completion and the metamorphosis of the former. The ego-ideal in fact substitutes for the double, that is for the anticipatory image of the unity of the ego, at the very moment this unity is achieved, the new anticipation of the subject's libidinal maturity. This is why every deficiency in the imago forming the ego-ideal will tend to produce a certain introversion of the personality by a narcissistic withdrawal of libido. This introversion can further express itself as a more or less regressive stagnation of the psychic relationships formed by the weaning complex—which is what is essentially defined by the analytic concept of schizonoia.

Discord between the parental couple; Psychoanalysts have stressed the place that disturbances in the libido of the mother have in causing neuroses, and a minimum of experience reveals in numerous cases of neurosis a frigid mother whose sexuality, having been diverted into her relations with her children, has subverted the nature of those relations; the mother who smothers the children and indulges in excesses of tenderness which express, more or less consciously, repressed impulses; or the paradoxically dried-up mother full of unspoken severity and unconscious cruelty in which an altogether more profound fixation of the libido finds expression.

A correct evaluation cannot be made of these cases without taking into account a correlative anomaly in the father. Maternal frigidity must be understood, and its effects measured, in the vicious circle of libidinal disequilibrium which makes up the family circle in such cases. In our opinion the psychological fate of the child depends above all on the relationship shown between the parental images. This is why a lack of harmony between the parents is always harmful to the child and why the most secret forms of this discord are no less pernicious than the most clearly acknowledged memories of the ill-matched nature of his parents' union. Indeed, there is no set of circumstances more favourable to the identification described above as neurotogenic than the very sure perception the child has of the neurotic meaning of the barriers that separate his parents from one another in their relationship. This is especially true for the perception of the father because of the revelatory function his image has in the process of sexual sublimation.

The prevalence of the weaning complex: It is therefore back to the sexual discord between the parents that we must trace the prevailing influence that the weaning complex will continue to have on a development it can affect in several neurotic forms.

The subject will be condemned indefinitely to repeat the task of detaching himself from the mother—here we find the meaning of many different kinds of compulsive behaviour, extending from the fugues of the runaway child to the chaotic breakups which may mark the behaviour of older people.

Alternatively the subject remains a prisoner of the images of the complex and subject as much to their deadly influence as to their narcissistic forms—these are the more or less intentional cases of wasting away that we have called non-violent suicides in order to note the meaning of certain oral or digestive neuroses. These are also the cases of libidinal investment that in hypochondria reveal the most unusual endoscopies, such as the more understandable but still curious concern for the imaginary equilibrium between what is gained by eating and what must be lost by excretion. Furthermore this psychic stagnation may display its social corollary in the stagnation of domestic bonds when the members of the family group cling together in a cell isolated from society by their "imaginary illnesses", this cell being as sterile for the commerce of society as it is useless for its construction.

The inversion of sexuality; Finally a third atypical structure of the family situation must be distinguished. Though also concerned with sexual sublimation it touches in a most particular way the most delicate of all its functions, which is to ensure psychic sexualisation, that is, a certain match in the relationship between the imaginary personality of the subject and his biological sex. This relationship may be inverted at different levels of the psychic structure, including the psychological determination of manifest homosexuality.

Psychoanalysts had no need to dig very deep into the clearcut clinical data to incriminate here once again the mother's role both in her excessive tenderness towards the child and in the masculine traits of her own character. Inversion is brought about, at least for the male subject, by a triple mechanism. There is revealed, sometimes on the surface of consciousness but always at the level of direct observation, an affect fixation to the mother which, one can readily appreciate, implies the exclusion of all other

women. At a deeper level, but one still graspable even if only by poetic intuition, there is the narcissistic ambivalence by which the subject identifies himself with his mother and identifies the love object with his own mirror image. His mother's relationship to himself gives the form in which the modalities of his desire and his object choice are forever embedded—a desire motivated by tenderness and education an object who reproduces a certain moment in time of his double. Finally, in the depths of the psyche there appears a castrating intervention properly so called by which the mother gives expression to her own claims to masculinity.

Here the essential role of the relationship between the parents appears much more clearly; and analysts emphasise that the mother's character is also expressed on the conjugal level by a domestic tyranny whose masked or blatant forms, from emotional demands to the confiscation of family authority, betray their fundamental meaning of masculine protest. This protest finds a clear symbolic, moral and material expression in the satisfaction of holding on to the purse strings. The dispositions that in the husband regularly ensure a sort of harmony in this kind of couple only render more manifest the obscure harmonies that make married life the privileged place for the cultivation of neuroses. Having guided one or both of the spouses in making a divinatory choice of a complementary subject, the warnings coming from the unconscious of one respond without intermediary to the signs that reveal the unconscious of the other.

The prevalence of the male principle; Here again a supplementary consideration must be taken into account which, this time, links family processes to their cultural conditions. One can see in the masculine protest of women the ultimate consequence of the Oedipus complex. In the hierarchy of values that by being integrated into the very forms of reality constitute a culture,

one of the most characteristic is the harmony it defines between the male and female principles of life. The origins of our own culture are too closely linked to what we can call the adventure of the paternalistic family for it not to impose a prevalence of the male principle on all the forms with which it has enriched psychic development. The moral exaltation bestowed on the term masculinity suffices to show the extent of this bias.

We should expect from the sense of balance, which is the foundation of all thought, that this preference should have a reverse side: fundamentally it is the hidden existence beneath the masculine ideal of the feminine principle. The Virgin in her mystery has been the living sign of this. But it is an essential quality of the mind to create mystifications from the paradoxes of being that constitute it; and the very weight of these superstructures may eventually overturn their base. No link is clearer to the moral philosopher than that which unites the social progress of psychic inversion to a Utopian quality in the ideals of a culture. The analyst grasps the individual determinants of this link in the forms of moral sublimity through which the invert's mother exercises her most categorically emasculating action.

It is not by chance that we close this effort at systematising the family neuroses with psychic inversion. If indeed psychoanalysis began with the open forms of homosexuality and only then went on to recognise the more subtle discordances of inversion, the imaginary impasse of sexual polarisation must be understood in terms of a social antinomy, since the forms of our culture, customs and art, struggle and thought, are invisibly committed to it.

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